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The EEOC’s May 2016 final rule on employer wellness 
programs, along with two recent rulings by courts in 
Wisconsin, reflects the growing pains of a legal doctrine 
developing under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 
regarding the application of the statute’s provisions to 
wellness program requirements. This Note evaluates how 
ADA provisions should apply to two common components of 
workplace wellness programs, health risk assessments and 
biometric screenings, and the use of incentives by employers 
to increase employee participation in such programs. In 
particular, this Note examines the interplay of the ADA’s 
restrictions on medical examinations and inquiries, its 
exception for examinations and inquiries that are part of 
“voluntary” employee health programs, and its insurance 
“safe harbor” provision. After outlining inconsistencies in the 
application of the ADA’s provisions in recent “safe harbor” 
cases, this Note aims to clarify the debate and build on the 
EEOC’s new regulatory guidance by providing a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two recent rulings by courts in Wisconsin and the 
EEOC’s May 2016 regulations regarding wellness program 
incentives display the growing pains of a legal doctrine 
developing under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) regarding the application of the statute’s provisions 
to wellness program requirements. This Note evaluates how 
ADA provisions should apply to two common components of 
workplace wellness programs, health risk assessments and 
biometric screenings, and the use of incentives by employers 
to increase employee participation in such programs. In 
particular, this Note examines the interplay of the ADA’s 
restrictions on medical examinations and inquiries, its 
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exception for examinations and inquiries that are part of 
“voluntary” employee health programs, and its insurance 
“safe harbor” provision. The Note examines how the EEOC’s 
new regulations and regulatory guidance on the 
permissibility of wellness incentives may not fully resolve 
the ADA’s limits on the types of practices at issue in recent 
“safe harbor” cases and proposes a framework of analysis for 
applying the ADA’s provisions to health screening programs. 
Part II of the Note describes the characteristics of 
workplace wellness programs and provides an overview of 
the legal regime governing wellness incentives. Part III 
outlines inconsistencies in the application of the ADA’s 
provisions in recent cases and compares arguments by 
employers, plaintiffs, and the EEOC on how to treat wellness 
programs under the ADA. Part IV analyzes questions and 
arguments left unaddressed by the case law and the EEOC’s 
recently issued regulation governing wellness incentives and 
suggests an integrated approach for applying the ADA to 
wellness programs. 
II. BACKGROUND ON WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
AND RELEVANT LAWS 
While wellness programs are not new to the workplace,1 
their popularity has increased in recent years, a trend 
reflecting employers’ efforts to reduce healthcare costs and to 
 
1 Many employers began offering wellness programs in the 1980s, 
including programs involving blood pressure control, weight control, stress 
management, nutrition, and smoking cessation. Kristin Madison, 
Employer Wellness Incentives, the ACA, and the ADA: Reconciling Policy 
Objectives, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 411–13 (2015) (providing an 
overview of the history and early growth of workplace wellness programs). 
According to a survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, approximately 
82% of full-time employees in the public and private sectors had access to 
a wellness program in 2008, compared to 54% in 1998–99. E. Pierce Blue, 
Wellness Programs, the ADA, and GINA: Framing the Conflict, 31 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 369–70 (2014) (noting that the use of 
wellness programs has grown rapidly in the United States). 
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promote employee health, morale, and productivity.2 
Approximately half of all U.S. employers with at least fifty 
employees offer a wellness program,3 and the corporate 
wellness industry that services workplace wellness programs 
currently generates estimated annual revenues of more than 
$6 billion.4 To drive employee participation in these 
programs, many employers are increasingly using financial 
incentives of varying forms,5 including adjustments to health 
 
2 E.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TR., 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2016 ANNUAL SURVEY 212 (2016), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2016-
Annual-Survey [https://perma.cc/SV8H-72AS] [hereinafter 2016 EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY]; SARAH TURK, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 
OD4621: CORPORATE WELLNESS SERVICES IN THE US, JULY 2016, at 5–8 
(2016), http://clients1.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/default.aspx?entid 
=4621 [https://perma.cc/3G65-WGSG] [hereinafter IBISWORLD REPORT]. 
3 SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 18–19 (2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR25
4/RAND_RR254.pdf  [https://perma.cc/MT76-ZPTH] [hereinafter RAND 
2013 REPORT] (noting that greater percentages of large employers offer 
wellness programs and therefore considerably more than half (79%) of the 
employees working at the surveyed firms had access to wellness 
programs); see also 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 
2, at 215–28 (presenting survey data on wellness programs by firm size, 
program type, incentive type, and other parameters). 
4 IBISWORLD REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. 
5 See, e.g., Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and 
the Erosion of Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435, 440–41 (2013) 
(“[E]mployers have shown an increasing interest in programs that use 
financial incentives to motivate employees to change behavior. In [a 2011 
survey], eighty-six percent of employers indicated they plan to implement 
incentive programs within the next three to five years.”); Sharon Begley, 
Employer Incentives for U.S. Worker Wellness Programs Set Record, 
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
healthcare-wellness-idUKKBN0MM0BB20150326 [https://perma.cc/9HB3-
JFKG] (citing data from a 2015 survey by Fidelity Investments and the 
National Business Group on Health of 121 U.S. employers); Mike Colias, 
Obese Police: Firms Force Workers to Slim Down, CRAIN’S CHICAGO 
BUSINESS (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/ 
20070226/NEWS/200023993 [https://perma.cc/EAY9-ZXUM] (“Frustrated 
by traditional ‘wellness’ programs that suffer from low participation, more 
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insurance contributions (e.g., premium surcharges or 
discounts).6 According to one set of surveys, employers spent 
an average of $693 per employee on wellness incentives in 
2015, more than 50% higher than the per-employee average 
from five years prior,7 and 81% of employees received 
wellness incentives in 2015, up from 73% in 2014.8 
Simultaneously, a complex ecosystem of statutes and 
regulations has been evolving as federal and state 
policymakers respond to the emerging forms and functions of 
workplace wellness programs.9 The concurrent developments 
in wellness program designs and the web of regulatory 
standards shaping those designs have raised new questions 
 
employers are dangling incentives—gift cards, discounts on health 
premiums or even cash—to persuade workers to shed pounds.”). 
6 See, e.g., Lamkin, supra note 5, at 441; Madison, supra note 1, at 
414–15. 
7 Press Release, National Business Group on Health & Fidelity 
Investments, Companies Are Spending More on Corporate Wellness 
Programs but Employees Are Leaving Millions on the Table (Mar. 26, 
2015), https://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cf 
m?ID=252 [https://perma.cc/Y2PR-3QFZ]. This average is an increase from 
$594 in 2014 and $430 in 2010. Large companies with more than 20,000 
employees spend the most on wellness programs, with a per-employee 
average of $878 in 2015; companies with between 5,000 and 20,000 
employees spent an average of $661 in 2015. Id. 
8 Press Release, National Business Group on Health & Fidelity 
Investments, Companies Expand Wellness Programs to Focus on 
Improving Employees’ Emotional and Financial Well-Being (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID=276 
[https://perma.cc/FZN3-55AZ] (“The percent of employees receiving 
incentives steadily increased as employers expand well-being programs to 
appeal to additional elements of overall well-being, as well as provide 
employees with more ways to earn incentives.”). 
9 See generally KAREN POLLITZ & MATTHEW RAE, KAISER FAMILY FOUN., 
ISSUE BRIEF: WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS CHARACTERISTICS AND 
REQUIREMENTS 1–5 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-
Workplace-Wellness-Programs-Characteristics-and-Requirements 
[https://perma.cc/W68Z-777R] (summarizing the main federal law 
provisions that directly address wellness programs); Madison, supra note 
1, at 416–33 (discussing the regulatory regimes affecting wellness 
programs and their underlying policy objectives). 
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about employee privacy and dignity, protections against 
discrimination, employer control over health and behavior, 
and the proper balancing of the inherent goals of wellness 
programs within the patchwork of applicable laws. In 
particular, concerns about the applicability and compatibility 
of regulations under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), as amended by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) have recently 
prompted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) to engage in rulemaking in order to harmonize its 
position on the permissibility of wellness incentives under 
the ADA with the incentive structures authorized by HIPAA-
ACA regulations.10 Tucked into the EEOC’s new rules was a 
rebuttal to the inordinate role that one particular ADA 
provision has played in recent suits challenging employers’ 
use of wellness incentives—the “most controversial”11 
§ 12201(c), the ADA’s “insurance safe harbor.”12 
A. Forms and Functions of Wellness Programs 
The term “wellness program” broadly encompasses 
numerous types of services and activities that combine in 
multiple ways to characterize employer-sponsored wellness 
programs; these offerings include health risk assessments, 
biometric screenings, disease management programs, weight 
loss programs, gym membership discounts, smoking 
cessation programs, nutrition classes, and web-based 
resources for healthy living.13 In view of the differing 
 
10 See discussion infra Section II.B.3. 
11 Katarina E. Klenner, Competing Wellness Rules Pose Compliance 
Challenges, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jul. 19, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/competing-wellness-rules-n73014445179/ 
[https://perma.cc/6AYL-U7UV]. 
12 See discussion infra Section II.B.4. 
13 See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. 
TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2015 ANNUAL SURVEY 196–98 (2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-2015-employer-health-benefits-survey 
[https://perma.cc/HGS3-XHGF] [hereinafter 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH 
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characteristics of these components, and their differing 
attendant legal implications, it is useful to define them for 
conceptual clarity. In particular, it is helpful to distinguish 
health screening programs, specifically health risk 
assessments and biometric screenings, which sometimes may 
be the sole components of a “wellness program,” from other 
types of wellness offerings, such as exercise programs and 
health education classes. The following exercise in 
categorization will enable a sharper analysis of the conflicted 
legal treatment of “wellness programs” in recent case law, 
regulations, and proposed legislation. 
Health risk assessments (“HRAs”) are medical 
questionnaires designed to identify an employee’s health 
risks, generally by asking questions about medical history, 
health status, and lifestyle.14 The 2016 Employer Health 
Benefits Survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation (“KFF”) 
and Health Research & Educational Trust (“HRET”) found 
that 59% of large employers (firms with 200 or more 
employees) that offer health benefits to employees also offer 
employees an opportunity to complete an HRA;15 these firms 
collectively employ more than 24 million covered workers.16 
Among these firms, around half provide incentives to 
employees who complete an HRA, and approximately three 
in ten provide those incentives in the form of lower premium 
 
BENEFITS SURVEY]; see also RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at xiii (“A 
broad range of benefits are offered under the label ‘workplace wellness,’ 
from multi-component programs to single interventions, and benefits can 
be offered by employers directly, through a vendor, group health plans, or 
a combination of both.”); id. at 21 (“A formal and universally accepted 
definition for workplace wellness programs has yet to emerge, and the 
range of benefits offered under this label is broad.”). 
14 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 212; see 
also RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. 
15 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 212; see 
also RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (reporting that survey results 
suggest approximately 65% of employers with wellness programs use 
HRAs). 
16 POLLITZ & RAE, supra note 9, at 6. 
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contributions or reduced healthcare cost sharing.17 While the 
2015 Employer Health Benefits Survey by KFF and HRET 
found that approximately half of employees who are asked to 
complete an HRA actually do so,18 notably, 5% of large firms 
surveyed in 2015 by KFF and HRET reported that they 
required employees to complete an HRA in order to enroll in 
an employer-sponsored health plan.19 
Many wellness programs also incorporate biometric 
screenings in the form of in-person medical examinations 
and blood tests that measure risk factors such as body 
weight, blood pressure, cholesterol, stress, and nutrition.20 
The 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey reported that, 
similar to the proportion of employers offering HRAs, 53% of 
large firms offered employees the opportunity to complete 
biometric screening;21 of these firms, more than half provide 
 
17 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 212–13 
(reporting that “[a]mong large firms that have a health risk assessment, 
54% offer an incentive to employees to complete the assessment” and 
“[a]mong large firms offering incentives for employees to complete a health 
risk assessment, 51% lower premium contributions or reduce cost 
sharing”). 
18 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 13, at 197. 
The 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey found that a slightly smaller 
percentage (41%) of employees completed HRAs offered by employers. 
2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 213. 
Additionally, “[t]here is considerable variation in the percentage of 
workers who complete the assessment. Nineteen percent of large firms 
providing employees the opportunity to complete a health risk assessment 
report that more than 75% of their employees complete the assessment, 
while 41% report no more than 25% of employees complete the 
assessment.” Id. 
19 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 13, at 197. A 
directly comparable figure does not appear in the 2016 Employer Health 
Benefits Survey. See 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 
2, at 218 exhibit 12.5 (presenting a bar chart conveying percentages of 
firms offering different types of incentives to employees to encourage 
completion of HRAs). 
20 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 212–13; 
see also RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. 
21 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 213; see 
also RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (reporting that survey results 
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incentives to employees who complete a screening, and 
approximately three in ten provide those incentives in the 
form of lower premium contributions or reduced healthcare 
cost sharing.22 Notably, 14% of large firms with biometric 
screening programs reward or penalize employees for 
reaching specified biometric outcomes, such as achieving a 
target body mass index.23 Additionally, 7% of large firms 
surveyed in 2015 by KFF and HRET reported that they 
required employees to complete a biometric screening in 
order to enroll in an employer-sponsored health plan.24 
Employers and insurers often use the health information 
generated through HRAs and biometric screenings to target 
wellness offerings to employees based on their specific risk 
conditions.25 These offerings include health promotion 
programs such as exercise programs, health education 
classes, stress management counseling, and smoking 
 
suggest approximately 49% of employers with wellness programs conduct 
biometric screenings). 
22 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 213 
(reporting that “[a]mong large firms with biometric screening programs, 
59% offer an incentive for employees to complete the screening” and 
“[a]mong large firms with an incentive for employees to complete biometric 
screening, 52% lower premium contributions or reduce cost sharing”). 
23 Id. “There is considerable variation in the size of the incentives that 
employers offer for meeting biometric outcomes. Among large firms 
offering a reward or penalty for meeting biometric outcomes, the 
maximum reward is valued at $150 dollars or less for 10% percent of firms 
and $1,000 or more for 21% of firms.” Id. 
24 2015 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 13, at 197. 
The 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey did not report a directly 
comparable figure. See 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra 
note 2, at 222 exhibit 12.11 (presenting a bar chart conveying percentages 
of firms offering different types of incentives to employees to encourage 
completion of biometric screenings). 
25 E.g., 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 
212; RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at xv (“The RAND Employer 
Survey data suggest that 80 percent of employers with a wellness program 
screen their employees for health risks, and our case study results show 
that employers use results for program planning and evaluation and for 
directing employees to preventive interventions that address their health 
risks.”). 
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cessation programs; a majority of large firms offer such 
programs.26 This Note refers to these programs collectively 
as “wellness management programs.”27 According to the 2016 
Employer Health Benefits Survey, 83% of large firms 
offering health benefits also offer some form of wellness 
management program to encourage employees to make 
lifestyle or behavior changes, and 42% of these large firms 
attach financial incentives to these programs.28 Up to 40% of 
large firms offering health screening programs require 
employees to complete the health screening activities (HRAs 
and/or biometric screenings) to be eligible for wellness 
management program incentives.29 In addition, once an 
employer has screened and identified an employee with 
health risks, the employer may require that employee to 
complete a wellness management program or face a financial 
penalty;30 the 2014 Employee Health Benefits Survey 
 
26 E.g., 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 
213 (noting that “[t]hese programs may be offered directly by the firm, an 
insurer, or a third-party contractor”). 
27 The categories described above are drawn from the Employer 
Health Benefits Surveys by KFF and HRET. See, e.g., 2016 EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 212–13 (discussing separately 
data for HRAs, biometric screening, and “wellness and health promotion 
programs”). Other helpful ways of categorizing wellness program 
components are possible. See RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 
(distinguishing between screening activities (which include HRAs and 
biometric screenings), preventive interventions that address manifest 
health risks (such as weight-reduction counseling), and health promotion 
activities that further healthy lifestyles (such as healthy cafeteria 
options)). 
28 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 213–14. 
Approximately 46% of small firms offering wellness benefits offer some 
form of wellness management program. Id. 
29 Id. at 213. Specifically, 44% of large firms offering HRAs require 
employees to complete an HRA to be eligible for incentives under wellness 
management programs, and 32% of large firms offering biometric 
screenings require employees to complete a screening to be eligible for 
wellness management program incentives. Id. 
30 See, e.g., L.V. Anderson, Workplace Wellness Programs Are a Sham, 
Slate (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/ 
the_ladder/2016/09/workplace_wellness_programs_are_a_sham.html 
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reported that 7% of large firms asking employees to complete 
HRAs had such penalties in place.31 
In implementing these various types of services and 
wellness-based incentives, companies have also begun to 
integrate new technologies, such as wearable devices and 
mobile applications that track employee health and 
behavior.32 The use of wireless biometric sensor devices has 
the potential to expand the reach of wellness programs by 
enabling remote health monitoring, with benefits accruing to 
employees who might desire to keep track of chronic 
conditions like diabetes or high blood pressure.33 Such 
devices, however, could also enable employers to remotely 
monitor employee health and behaviors, and some employees 
may find this seriously troubling, especially if combined with 
wellness program incentives that affect health insurance 
premiums and cost-sharing provisions.34 
As evidence of variable participation rates suggests,35 not 
all employees have embraced the potential opportunities 
presented by workplace wellness programs. In a national 
survey conducted by the Employee Benefits Research 
Institute, 33% of employees cited the concern that employers 
would learn their personal health information as a reason 
 
[https://perma.cc/J5DF-X5KG] (describing a personal biometric screening 
experience and explaining that, because she had “passed” the biometric 
screening, she “wouldn’t have to take a multi-week online health-
improvement course to avoid paying an extra $600 on [her] health 
insurance next year”). 
31 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS 2014 ANNUAL SURVEY 206 (2014), http://files.kff.org/atta
chment/2014-employer-health-benefits-survey-full-report 
[https://perma.cc/59A3-2FFS]. 
32 See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First 
Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 118–19 (2014). 
33 Patrick J. Skerrett, The Potential of Remote Health Monitoring at 
Work, HARV. BUS. REV. 6 (Dec. 9, 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/12/the-
potential-of-remote-health [https://perma.cc/A2MD-AZT2]. 
34 See Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the 
Erosion of Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435, 461–62 (2013). 
35 See RAND 2013 REPORT, supra note 3, at 36–42. 
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they declined to participate in wellness programs.36 Such 
concern may be well founded since wellness programs collect 
an enormous amount of personal health data from employees 
through online forms, company surveys, wearable devices, 
lab tests, and other features.37 Additionally, many wellness 
programs routinely obtain passive consent from program 
participants allowing this information to be shared with 
business partners and even to be used for marketing 
purposes.38 To complicate matters further, privacy laws that 
apply to doctors, hospitals, and employers often do not apply 
to wellness contractors,39 and biometric data from wearable 
devices are not clearly protected by the current body of data 
security law.40 
Financial incentives, of course, also influence employee 
participation rates, though a survey by the Employee 
 
36 PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FINDINGS FROM THE 
2013 EBRI/GREENWALD & ASSOCIATES CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT IN HEALTH 
CARE SURVEY 17 (2013), www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_012-
13.No393.CEHCS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GFH-G9GQ]. Nearly 70% of 
survey respondents stated that they did not participate in wellness 
programs because they could make changes on their own; 56% of survey 
respondent reported that they did not have enough time to participate. Id. 
at 12. 
37 E.g., Jay Hancock, Workplace Wellness Programs Put Employee 
Privacy at Risk, CNN (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/healt
h/workplace-wellness-privacy-risk-exclusive/index.html [https://perma.cc 
/RG2U-64GN]. 
38 POLLITZ & RAE, supra note 9, at 5. Many wellness programs require 
employees to sign up on a vendor’s website, where participants must agree 
to the vendor’s privacy policy and terms of service. Tara Siegel Bernard, 




39 E.g., Hancock, supra note 37. 
40 E.g., Bernard, supra note 38; see also Peppet, supra note 32, at 87–
97, 129–39 (discussing privacy and security issued raised by “Internet of 
Things” devices, such as health and fitness sensors). Additionally, a 
technical security problem lies in the fact that de-identified data can be re-
identified and used for marketing, potential credit screening, and other 
purposes. Hancock, supra note 37; Peppet, supra note 32, at 133–35. 
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Benefits Research Institute reports that more employees 
cited health concerns and convenience as reasons for 
participating in wellness programs (70–77%) than cited 
financial incentives (50–58%).41 How exactly do financial 
incentives impact participation rates? A RAND Corporation 
report found that employers with reward-only incentive 
plans have higher median participation rates (40%) than 
employers that do not use incentives (20%), but employers 
that used penalty-only incentives or mixed incentives had 
the highest participation rates (73%).42 Notably, the report 
also found that wellness program configuration (whether 
employers offered comprehensive or limited services) was 
independently associated with higher participation rates, 
and that participation rates for comprehensive programs 
(which combine screening, intervention, and prevention 
policies) were less sensitive to incentive schemes.43 
The proliferation of wellness program services, 
configurations, and incentives has created a diverse array of 
options for employers and employees alike. At the same time, 
the evolution of workplace wellness programs has also 
created opportunities and challenges for lawmakers aiming 
to influence the health and healthcare-related decisions of 
employers and employees. Given that employer-sponsored 
insurance covers more than half of the non-elderly 
population, approximately 150 million people in total,44 and 
given that large firms account for more than half of U.S. 
employment,45 the increasing use of wellness programs and 
of financial incentives linked to health insurance has the 
 
41 FRONSTIN, supra note 36, at 17. 
42 SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS: SERVICES OFFERED, PARTICIPATION, AND INCENTIVES 28 (2014), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/WellnessStudyFinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4QJ-ZPUZ]. The research report was sponsored by the 
Employee Benefits Security Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. Id. at iii. 
43 Id. at 27–28; see also POLLITZ & RAE, supra note 9 (summarizing 
research on the efficacy of workplace wellness programs). 
44 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1. 
45 Madison, supra note 1, at 412–13. 
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potential to profoundly impact a large number of American 
workers.46 In this context, laws that promote and restrict 
wellness programs have meaningful ramifications, not only 
for the business plans of employers, but also in the lives of 
employees and their families. The thoughtful navigation of 
existing laws, as well as the mindful forging of new laws, is 
therefore of critical importance to employees, employers, and 
lawmakers alike. 
B. A Shifting Legal Landscape 
Several federal laws supply regulatory frameworks that 
govern the use and design of wellness programs within the 
context of broader protections against health-related 
discrimination in the workplace.47 Regulations under 
HIPAA, the ACA, and the ADA together create a system of 
rules prohibiting health status-based discrimination in 
health insurance and disability-based discrimination in 
employment. Provisions within these laws, however, also 
reflect policy decisions to promote workplace wellness 
programs and, specifically, the use of financial incentives to 
encourage employees to participate in their employers’ 
wellness initiatives. Regulators have had to face the task of 
reconciling the tensions between incentives tied to 
employees’ adherence to wellness programs and 
commitments to preventing health-based discrimination. 
Complicating this endeavor, the system of legal rules 
governing wellness programs generally, and wellness 
incentives specifically, has been shifting, and doubtlessly will 
continue to shift, in response to new statutes, regulations, 
and case law; future legislation, whether specifically directed 
at wellness programs—such as the proposed “Preserving 
Employee Wellness Programs Act”  (H.R. 1313)48—or more 
 
46 Id. 
47 See generally, e.g., POLLITZ & RAE, supra note 9, at 1–5 (providing 
an overview of federal standards for wellness programs). 
48 Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th 
Cong. (2017); see infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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broadly aimed at reforming healthcare, may yet reshape the 
legal landscape as well. 
After providing a brief review of the main statutes that 
address workplace wellness programs, this Section provides 
essential background on the relevant provisions of the ADA, 
how the EEOC has interpreted those provisions, and the 
influence of HIPAA-ACA regulations on the EEOC’s 
regulatory approach. This Section then introduces issues 
arising from recent cases applying the ADA’s “insurance safe 
harbor,” in conjunction with its restrictions on disability-
related inquiries and medical examinations, to the health 
screening components of workplace wellness programs. 
1. Overview of Federal Laws 
HIPAA, which was enacted on August 21, 1996, added 
sections to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the Employee 
Retirement Income Act of 1974, and the Public Health 
Service Act to prohibit discrimination based on a health 
factor by group health plans and group health insurance 
issuers.49 These nondiscrimination provisions included an 
exception for wellness program incentives,50 however, and 
 
49 See generally, e.g., Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in 
Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,014 (Dec. 
13, 2006) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 
C.F.R. pt. 146) (providing background on HIPAA’s nondiscrimination 
provisions and the development of final rules implementing those 
provisions). Health factors include (1) health status, (2) medical condition, 
including both physical and mental illnesses, (3) claims experience, (4) 
receipt of health care, (5) medical history, (6) genetic information, (7) 
evidence of insurability, and (8) disability. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (2016). 
50 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012). HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provisions 
do not “prevent a group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering 
group health insurance coverage, from establishing premium discounts or 
rebates or modifying otherwise applicable copayments or deductibles in 
return for adherence to programs of health promotion and disease 
prevention.” Id.; see also Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in 
Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,017–19 
(discussing the statutory provision and development of regulations 
thereunder). 
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HIPAA’s final regulations on wellness programs, issued in 
2006, established that, for wellness programs meeting 
certain nondiscrimination requirements, incentives could 
reach up to 20% of the total cost of coverage under a group 
health plan.51 The ACA, which was enacted on March 23, 
2010, increased the maximum permissible incentive size to 
30% of the cost of coverage.52 
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination 
based on disability and restricts employers from asking for 
medical information from employees.53 The ADA contains 
some exceptions to these general rules, however, and allows 
medical inquiries and examinations that are conducted as 
part of a voluntary wellness program.54 Similarly, Title II of 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) 
prohibits employment discrimination based on genetic 
information and restricts employers from asking about an 
individual’s genetic information; GINA also provides an 
exception that applies when an employee voluntarily accepts 
 
51 Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in 
the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,017–19. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012). The ACA also authorized 
regulators to further increase the maximum incentive size to as much as 
50% of the cost of coverage. Id. (providing that the Secretaries of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, and the Treasury “may increase the reward 
available under this subparagraph to up to 50 percent of the cost of 
coverage if the Secretaries determine that such an increase is 
appropriate”). Final regulations under this provision increased the 
maximum reward to 50% of the cost of coverage for wellness programs 
designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use. Incentives for 
Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 33,158, 33,166–67 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 and 147). 
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (d)(4)(A) (2012). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2012); see also Madison, supra note 1, at 
437 (noting that “[i]n its 2000 guidance, the EEOC explained the ADA’s 
exception by linking the term ‘voluntary’ to the concept of the ‘wellness 
program,’ rather than to inquiries or examinations. This approach departs 
from the ADA's statutory text but is consistent with the House Report’s 
use of the term ‘voluntary’”). 
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health or genetic services that are offered as part of an 
employer-sponsored wellness program.55 
2. The ADA’s Voluntariness Exception 
Title I of the ADA generally prohibits discrimination 
“against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.”56 The ADA also provides that this 
prohibition against discrimination “shall include medical 
examinations and inquiries.”57 In addition to provisions 
applicable to pre-employment practices and employee 
entrance examinations,58 the ADA provides: 
A covered entity shall not require a medical 
examination and shall not make inquiries of an 
employee as to whether such employee is an 
individual with a disability or as to the nature or 
severity of the disability, unless such examination or 
inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.59 
The EEOC defines “disability-related inquiry” broadly as 
a “question (or series of questions) that is likely to elicit 
information about a disability.”60 The EEOC defines a 
“medical examination” as “a procedure or test that seeks 
 
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1 (2012). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term “qualified individual” means “an 
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual 
holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1) (2012). 
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)–(3) (2012). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). 
60 Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical 
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 27, 2000), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [http://perma.cc/ 
E7V7-LW6N] [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance]. 
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information about an individual’s physical or mental 
impairments or health.”61 Examples of medical examinations 
include blood pressure screening, cholesterol testing, range-
of-motion tests, pulmonary function tests, and vision tests.62 
Importantly, the provision applies to all employees, not only 
those with disabilities.63 Generally speaking, if a wellness 
program does not require participating employees to answer 
disability-related questions or undergo medical 
examinations, then the ADA “simply requires that an 
employer make any reasonable accommodation necessary to 
enable an employee with a disability to participate.”64 
 
61 Id. 
62 Id. Procedures and tests that are not considered “medical 
examinations” under the ADA include drug tests, physical agility tests 
(which measure an employee’s ability to perform job tasks), physical 
fitness tests (which measure an employee’s performance of physical tasks 
but do not measure physiological responses such as heart rate or blood 
pressure), and psychological personality tests. Id. 
63 Id. The enforcement guidance explains: 
This statutory language makes clear that the ADA’s 
restrictions on inquiries and examinations apply to all 
employees, not just those with disabilities. Unlike other 
provisions of the ADA which are limited to qualified 
individuals with disabilities, the use of the term 
“employee” in this provision reflects Congress's intent to 
cover a broader class . . . Requiring an individual to show 
that s/he is a person with a disability in order to challenge 
a disability-related inquiry or medical examination would 
defeat this purpose. Any employee, therefore, has a right to 
challenge a disability-related inquiry or medical 
examination that is not job-related and consistent with 
business necessity. 
Id. Additionally, a medical examination or inquiry may be “job-related and 
consistent with business necessity” when an employer “has a reasonable 
belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee's ability to 
perform essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or 
(2) an employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.” Id. 
64 Written Testimony of Christopher Kuczynski, Acting Associate Legal 
Counsel, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/5-8-13/kuczynski.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/KR5Z-NS9J] [hereinafter Kuczynski Testimony]. 
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For wellness programs that involve medical examinations 
or inquiries, as many do by consisting of health screening 
programs that utilize HRAs and biometric screenings, 
§ 12112(d)(4)(B) provides an exception that allows employers 
to “conduct voluntary medical examinations, including 
voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee 
health program available to employees at that work site.”65 
In 2000, the EEOC issued enforcement guidance taking the 
position that a wellness program is “voluntary” under the 
ADA “as long as an employer neither requires participation 
nor penalizes employees who do not participate.”66 However, 
the enforcement guidance did not offer further direction on 
the permissibility of wellness incentives, which were not as 
common at the time the guidance was issued as presently.67 
In 2014, the EEOC brought enforcement actions against 
three employers that had imposed heavy penalties, including 
the full denial of health insurance coverage, on employees 
who did not complete the health screening components of 
their “wellness programs” (e.g., who did not undergo 
biometric screenings).68 In response to this litigation, 
 
65 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2012). This exception is sometimes 
referred to as the “voluntariness exception.” See, e.g., Madison, supra note 
1, at 432. Additionally, “[a] covered entity may make inquiries into the 
ability of an employee to perform job-related functions.” § 12112(d)(4)(B). 
66 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 60; see also supra note 
54. 
67 See Kuczynski Testimony, supra note 64. In 2009, legal counsel for 
the EEOC issued a letter—in response to an inquiry by a county as to 
whether it would be permissible to condition participation in a health plan 
on completion of an HRA—that suggested financial incentives would be 
permissible if they remained under 20% of the cost of health insurance 
coverage, the limit provided by the 2006 HIPAA regulations. This portion 
of the letter was rescinded two months later, however. See Madison, supra 
note 1, at 426–28 (reviewing the history of EEOC enforcement guidance on 
the meaning of “voluntary”). 
68 See EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 14-4517, 2014 WL 5795481 
(D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2014); EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849 
(W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2017); EEOC v. Orion 
Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-1019, 2016 WL 5107019, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 
19, 2016). 
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employers and groups such as the Business Roundtable 
argued that the ADA should not be interpreted to restrict the 
use of financial incentives authorized by HIPAA and the 
ACA.69 On March 2, 2015, Rep. John Kline introduced a bill 
into Congress, the “Preserving Employee Wellness Programs 
Act” (H.R. 1189), that declared that wellness programs 
complying with the ACA’s requirements for offering wellness 
incentives would not violate the ADA or GINA.70 Then, in 
April 2015, the EEOC issued a proposed rule seeking to 
resolve questions about the permissibility under the ADA of 
wellness programs meeting the standards of HIPAA-ACA 
regulations. 
3. Wellness Incentives and Voluntariness 
On May 17, 2016, the EEOC issued a final rule to provide 
guidance on the application of the ADA’s “voluntary” 
wellness programs provision, reflecting an effort by the 
agency to harmonize the standards for allowable wellness 
incentives under the ADA and HIPAA-ACA regulations.71 In 
its discussion of the interaction of the ADA’s and HIPAA’s 
nondiscrimination provisions in its Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, the EEOC explained that, while a reading of 
“voluntary” in isolation could plausibly limit wellness 
incentives to de minimis rewards or penalties, such an 
interpretation would make impermissible under the ADA 
many wellness program incentives expressly permitted by 
 
69 See, e.g., BRT Letter in Response to EEOC Actions Targeting 
Employer Wellness Programs, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://businessroundtable.org/resources/brt-letter-response-eeoc-actions-
targeting-employer-wellness-programs [https://perma.cc/Z82V-VXZB]; 
Madison, supra note 1, at 429; POLLITZ & RAE, supra note 9, at 3. 
70 Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1189, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
71 Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 31,126 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
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HIPAA and the ACA.72 While the EEOC acknowledged that 
compliance with HIPAA-ACA regulations is not 
determinative of compliance with the ADA, the agency 
explained that it “believes that it has a responsibility to 
interpret the ADA in a manner that reflects both the ADA’s 
goal of limiting employer access to medical information and 
HIPAA’s and the Affordable Care Act’s provisions promoting 
wellness programs.”73 
Regulations implementing HIPAA’s nondiscrimination 
provisions distinguish between two types of wellness 
programs: participatory and health-contingent.74 
Participatory wellness programs either do not provide a 
reward or do not condition rewards on an employee’s 
satisfaction of a standard related to a health factor.75 
Examples include a diagnostic testing program that rewards 
employees for participation and does not base any part of the 
reward on outcomes, and a program that rewards employees 
for attending free health education seminars.76 Under 
HIPAA, participatory wellness programs are permissible as 
long as they are made available to all similarly situated 
individuals.77 Notably, HIPAA regulations do not limit the 
magnitude of incentives that employers may offer for 
 
72 Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,659, 21,662 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
73 Id. 
74 E.g., Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group 
Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,158, 33,158–59 (Jun. 3, 2013) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 and 147). 
75 Id. at 33,160–61. 
76 Id. Other examples include: “A program that reimburses employees 
for all or part of the cost for membership in a fitness center [and] a 
program that reimburses employees for the costs of participating, or that 
otherwise provides a reward for participating, in a smoking cessation 
program without regard to whether the employee quits smoking . . .” 
Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 
80 Fed. Reg. at 21,661. 
77 Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group 
Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33,161. 
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participatory wellness programs;78 because incentives tied to 
participatory wellness programs are not based on health 
factors, they do not implicate the core of HIPAA’s protections 
against health-based discrimination. 
Health-contingent wellness programs, on the other hand, 
require employees to satisfy a standard related to a health 
factor to obtain a reward.79 HIPAA’s rules discuss two types 
of health-contingent programs. Activity-only health-
contingent programs, such as walking, diet, and exercise 
programs, incentivize employees to complete an activity 
related to a health factor but do not require an individual to 
attain a specific health outcome to obtain the reward.80 
Outcome-based health-contingent programs, meanwhile, 
require employees to attain or maintain a specific health 
outcome, such as achieving certain results on biometric 
screenings, to obtain a reward.81 Because these programs 
involve incentives that run directly against HIPAA’s 
prohibition against health-based discrimination in group 
health plans, employers must abide by five specific 
requirements to comply with HIPAA’s rules,82 including the 
 
78 Id.; see also David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and Efforts to 
Encourage Healthy Choices by Individuals, 92 N.C.L. REV. 1637, 1649 
(2014) (“To encourage enrollment in employer wellness programs, the ACA 
extends provisions in [HIPAA] that allow employers to promote program 
participation with financial incentives. For incentives that are tied simply 
to participation, there are no limits on the magnitude of the incentives. 
Employers can reward their employees with $50, $500, or $5,000 if they 
sign up for workplace wellness programs.”). 
79 Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group 
Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33,161. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 33,162–66. The five requirements may be summarized as 
follows: 
Generally, health-contingent wellness programs must be 
available to all similarly situated individuals and must: (1) 
Give eligible individuals an opportunity to qualify for a 
reward at least once per year; (2) limit the size of the 
reward to no more than 30 percent of the total cost of 
coverage (or, 50 percent to the extent that the wellness 
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requirement that the reward for a health-contingent 
wellness program must not exceed 30% of the total cost of 
employee-only coverage under a group health plan or 50% for 
programs designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use.83 
The EEOC’s new regulations generally conform the 
agency’s position on wellness incentives to the standards 
contained in the HIPAA-ACA regulations; the final 
regulations provide that an employer may offer incentives up 
to the same maximum of 30% of the total cost of employee-
only coverage to promote wellness programs.84 They specify 
that an employee health program is “voluntary” as long as 
the employer (1) does not require participation; (2) does not 
deny coverage under any of its group health plans for 
nonparticipation or limit the extent of benefits for employees 
who do not participate beyond the maximum allowable 
incentives specified in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3); and (3) 
provides its employees with a notice describing the type of 
medical information that will be obtained, specific purposes 
for which the medical information will be used, and 
restrictions on the disclosure of the employee’s medical 
 
program is designed to prevent or reduce tobacco use): (3) 
provide a reasonable alternative standard (or waiver) to 
qualify for a reward; (4) be reasonably designed to promote 
health or prevent disease and not be overly burdensome; 
and, (5) disclose the availability of a reasonable alternative 
standard to qualify for the reward in plan materials that 
provide details regarding the wellness program. 
Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 31,126, 31,128 
(May 17, 2016). 
83 Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group 
Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33,159, 33,161–62. 
84 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3) (2016); see also Regulations Under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,133 (“To give meaning 
to the ADA’s requirement that an employee’s participation in a wellness 
program must be voluntary, the incentives for participation cannot be so 
substantial as to be coercive. . . . Nonetheless, although substantial, the 
Commission concludes that, given current insurance rates, offering an 
incentive of up to 30 percent of the total cost of self-only coverage does not, 
without more, render a wellness program coercive.”). 
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information.85 Additionally, a wellness program must be 
reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease to 
qualify as an “employee health program.”86 
Notably, however, the final rules extend the 30% limit 
based on the HIPAA-ACA framework to cover participatory 
wellness programs that ask employees to respond to 
disability-related inquires or undergo medical 
examinations.87 The difference between the proposed ADA 
rules and HIPAA rules reflects the distinct focuses of the 
relevant provisions within the two laws; whereas the HIPAA 
provisions focus on restricting wellness incentives to restrict 
health-based discrimination in insurance premiums, 
benefits, or eligibility based on a health factor, the relevant 
ADA provisions aim to ensure that medical examinations 
and inquiries are voluntary to restrict employers from 
obtaining medical information from employees and thereby 
prevent disability-related employment discrimination.88 
4. The ADA’s Insurance Safe Harbor 
Much attention has been paid by policymakers, 
employers, employees, and academics to questions 
surrounding the proper magnitude of wellness incentives. Is 
30% of the total cost of coverage—which includes the 
amounts the employer and employee pay—too much, 
 
85 § 1630.14(d)(2). Additionally, an employer may “not take any 
adverse employment action or retaliate against, interfere with, coerce, 
intimidate, or threaten employees within the meaning of Section 503 of 
the ADA.” § 1630.14(d)(2)(iii). 
86 § 1630.14(d)(1). 
87 § 1630.14(d)(3). 
88 See, e.g., Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. at 31,129 (“[The EEOC] reaffirms its conclusion that allowing 
certain incentives related to wellness programs, while limiting them to 
prevent economic coercion that could render provision of medical 
information involuntary, is the best way to effectuate the purposes of the 
wellness program provisions of both laws.”). 
CHE – FINAL  
304 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
 
unaffordable, coercive, arbitrary?89 Yet, recent cases 
considering whether the health screening components of 
wellness programs have violated the prohibition on 
disability-related inquiries and medical examinations 
contained in § 12112(d)(4)(A) have paid little, if any, 
attention to the meaning of “voluntary” in § 12112(d)(4)(B).90 
Instead, the spotlight has fallen on 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c), the 
ADA’s “insurance safe harbor,” which provides: 
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV 
of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or 
restrict— 
 (1) an insurer, hospital or medical service 
company, health maintenance organization, or 
any agent, or entity that administers benefit 
plans, or similar organizations from underwriting 
risks, classifying risks, or administering such 
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with 
State law; or 
(2) a person or organization covered by this 
chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing 
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit 
plan that are based on underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering such risks that 
are based on or not inconsistent with State law; 
or 
(3) a person or organization covered by this 
chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing 
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit 
plan that is not subject to State laws that 
regulate insurance. 
 
89 See generally, e.g., Regulations Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,132–36 (discussing public comments 
submitted to the EEOC regarding wellness incentives); Madison, supra 
note 1, at 433–55 (discussing how the goals underlying the ACA and ADA 
may support divergent approaches to setting limits on wellness 
incentives). 
90 See infra Part III. 
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Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter I and 
III.91 
In 2012, the reasoning of a court in Florida92 generated an 
analytical framework that has muddled the discussion over 
the meaning of § 12201(c) and its application to “wellness 
programs” in the subsequent case law, the EEOC’s new 
regulation, and recently proposed legislation. In response to 
the decisions in Seff v. Broward County93 and EEOC v. 
Flambeau, Inc.,94 which determined that certain wellness 
programs, and by extension, the financial incentives tied to 
these programs, were “terms” of a benefit plan “based on 
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such 
risks” and therefore protected by the insurance safe harbor, 
the EEOC added a provision in its final rules that explicitly 
states: “The ‘safe harbor’ provisions . . . applicable to health 
insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not 
apply to wellness programs, even if such plans are part of a 
covered entity’s health plan.”95 
In its responses to public comments, the EEOC noted 
that, in addition to employer associations and industry 
groups that had argued in favor of applying the safe harbor 
to wellness programs, “[s]everal members of Congress 
asserted that the EEOC was inappropriately seeking to 
rewrite the statute and vacate court decisions through 
regulation.”96 A bill introduced into Congress by Rep. 
Virginia Foxx in March, which has already generated sharp 
criticism based on concerns about its removing protections 
 
91 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012). 
92 Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d 
sub nom. Seff v. Broward Cty., Fla., 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). 
93 Id. 
94 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 851 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
95 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (2016). 
96 Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 31,130. 
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for employees’ genetic information,97 contains a blunt retort 
to the EEOC’s position, simply declaring: “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, section 501(c)(2) of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201(c)(2)) shall 
apply to workplace wellness programs or programs of health 
promotion or disease prevention offered by an employer in 
conjunction with an employer-sponsored health plan.”98 
III. ISSUES IN APPLICATIONS OF THE ADA TO 
WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
Three provisions in the ADA, § 12112(d)(4)(A), 
§ 12112(d)(4)(B), and § 12201(c), have shaped recent court 
decisions interpreting the statute’s application to two 
common components of workplace wellness programs, HRAs 
and biometric screenings, and the incentives that companies 
have adopted to increase employee participation in such 
health screening programs. While the EEOC’s recently 
issued regulation on wellness incentives directly responds to 
how courts have interpreted and applied the ADA’s 
insurance safe harbor to health screening programs, gaps 
remain in the developing doctrine governing the 
permissibility of different forms of health screening 
requirements. 
This Part of the Note will examine inconsistencies in the 
application of the three ADA provisions in recent cases and 
compare arguments by employers, plaintiffs, and the EEOC 
on how to treat wellness programs under the ADA. This Part 
 
97 See, e.g., Reed Abelson, How Healthy Are You? G.O.P. Bill Would 
Help Employers Find Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/health/workplace-wellness-programs-
health-genetic-data.html [https://perma.cc/RMH8-USNH]; Lena H. Sun, 
Employees Who Decline Genetic Testing Could Face Penalties Under 




98 Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th 
Cong. § 3(a)(1)(C) (2017). 
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will begin with a discussion of the struggle of courts and the 
EEOC to properly situate the safe harbor provision within 
arguments about the permissibility of wellness incentives. 
The Note will then explore how the EEOC’s new regulations, 
specifically 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6), and accompanying 
guidance do not completely resolve how the ADA governs 
health screening requirements in light of remaining 
questions about the precise application of the prohibition on 
disability-related inquires and medical examinations to 
health screening programs. 
A. Purpose of the Insurance Safe Harbor 
Recognizing that without clarification the ADA “could 
arguably find violative of its provisions any action taken by 
an insurer or employer which treats disabled persons 
differently under an insurance or benefit plan because they 
represent an increased hazard of death or illness,”99 
Congress provided § 12201(c), a construction clause 
“explaining that the ADA does not disrupt the current 
nature of insurance underwriting when based on valid 
classification of risk.”100 In short, the ADA’s “insurance safe 
harbor” makes clear that insurers and employers may treat 
disabled individuals differently under an employee benefit 
plan if justified by “legitimate underwriting or classification 
of risks,”101 but decisions concerning the insurance of 
disabled individuals that are not “based on bona fide risk 
 
99 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 138 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 421. 
100 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 24 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 306; see also id. at 136 (“As indicated earlier in this 
report, the main purposes of this legislation include prohibiting 
discrimination in employment, public services, and places of public 
accommodation. The Committee does not intend that any provisions of this 
legislation should affect the way the insurance industry does business in 
accordance with the State laws and regulations under which it is 
regulated.”). 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 493. 
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classification” must still conform with the ADA’s non-
discrimination requirements.102 As the EEOC noted in the 
preamble to its final rule, the insurance safe harbor 
protected some practices that are now unlawful, such as 
charging individuals in a group health plan higher rates 
based on the increased risks associated with their medical 
conditions.103 
On their face, the insurance safe harbor provisions are 
silent with respect to disability-related inquiries or medical 
examinations; instead, the safe harbor simply clarifies that 
the ADA’s prohibitions on discrimination in employment, 
public services, and places of public accommodation do not 
prevent differential treatment of disabled persons in the 
realm of insurance, so long as such treatment is based on 
sound actuarial principles. In 1998, however, the court in 
Barnes v. Benham Group,104 a case concerning an alleged 
violation of  § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition on disability-
related inquiries, applied § 12201(c)’s exception relating to 
insurance activities to uphold a requirement that employees 
complete a medical questionnaire in order to participate in 
an employer’s group health insurance plan. 
B. Barnes 
In Barnes, the defendant, an architectural and 
engineering design firm, sought to secure a new group health 
insurance plan for the thirty-four employees in its St. Paul 
office.105 To that end, the defendant’s employees were asked 
to complete application enrollment forms from three bidding 
group health insurance providers; these forms solicited 
 
102 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 138 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 421; see also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN 
EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (1993), 1993 WL 1497027. 
103 Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 31,126, 31,130 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
104 22 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (D. Minn. 1998). 
105 Id. at 1016–17. 
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biographical and medical information from employees, 
including questions about an employee’s history of health 
conditions, to allow for an assessment of the risks of insuring 
the defendant’s employees and calculation of a premium.106 
Employees who did not complete these forms were ineligible 
to participate in the group insurance plan and were asked to 
sign a waiver acknowledging they had declined the 
opportunity to apply for coverage.107 After the plaintiff 
refused to provide the requested information or sign the 
waiver, the defendant employer terminated the plaintiff’s 
employment, citing “insubordination,” leading to the 
plaintiff’s suit.108 To establish a case of illegal retaliation, the 
plaintiff argued that he was engaged in protected activity in 
opposing unlawful employer conduct, i.e., the allegedly 
unlawful medical inquiries that were required as part of the 
health insurance enrollment process.109 
The court, however, agreed with the defendant’s 
argument that the questions were allowed by the insurance 
safe harbor because the questions “were asked solely for the 
purpose of underwriting, classifying, and administering risks 
in conjunction with defendant’s search for a new group 
health plan,” and the court further noted that the employer 
defendant had “sought to establish, sponsor, observe, or 
administer the terms of a bona fide benefit plan based on 
underwriting, classifying, or administering risks.”110 The 
court reasoned that the “purpose of the safe harbor provision 
is to permit the development and administration of benefit 
plans in accordance with accepted principles of risk 
assessment,” and therefore the questions in the enrollment 
forms were permissible under the ADA.111 The analysis in 
Barnes pertaining to the application of the safe harbor to 
health questionnaires has been accepted by employers, 
 
106 Id at 1017, 1019. 
107 Id. at 1017. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1022. 
110 Id. at 1020. 
111 Id. 
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courts, and the EEOC alike.112 Essentially, the court viewed 
the requirement that employees complete the enrollment 
forms, in addition to the questions themselves, as part of the 
insurer’s process of underwriting insurance products and 
therefore protected by § 12201(c)(1).113 The employer 
defendant had acted to facilitate this process, with the 
intention of establishing terms of a benefit plan based on 
underwriting or classification of risks, consistent with the 
provision in § 12201(c)(2).114 
C. Seff 
More than a decade later in Seff v. Broward County, a 
district court in Florida dusted off the safe harbor analysis in 
Barnes in the process of ruling against class action plaintiffs 
who had challenged a $20.00 bi-weekly penalty for declining 
to complete an HRA and biometric screening that together 
comprised a “wellness program” offered by Broward 
County.115 Despite citing Barnes, the Florida court trudged 
through its interpretation of § 12201(c) by developing a 
unique two-step analysis of the safe harbor unmoored from 
the purpose and design of the provision. 
 
112 See, e.g., Opening Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Appellant at 29, Equal EEOC v. Flambeau, 846 F.3d 941 
(7th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1402) (“In contrast, a health risk assessment 
asking disability-related questions for the purpose of acquiring or pricing 
group health insurance could fall under the safe harbor exception for 
insurance underwriting.”) (citing Barnes, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1020 and Bloch 
v. Rockwell Lime Co., N0. 07–478, 2007 WL 4287275, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 
4, 2007)). 
113 See Barnes, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1020; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, 
Part 3, at 70 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 493 
(explaining that § 12201(c)(1) clarifies that insurers may continue to sell 
insurance products “so long as the standards used are based on sound 
actuarial data” and that § 12201(c)(2) “recognizes the need for employers, 
and/or agents thereof, to establish and observe the terms of employee 
benefit plans, so long as these plans are based on underwriting or 
classification of risks”). 
114 See Barnes, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1017, 1019–20. 
115 Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
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In 2009, “saddled with an aging workforce,” Broward 
County sought ways to address its increasing healthcare 
costs, including by attempting to improve the overall health 
of its workforce.116 Based on the recommendation of its 
healthcare consultant, Broward County adopted a health 
screening program117 as part of its health plan’s enrollment 
process.118 The health screening program consisted of two 
components: an HRA and a biometric screening; the HRA 
was an online medical questionnaire, and the biometric 
screening required a finger stick blood test to measure 
glucose and cholesterol levels.119 The program was 
administered and paid for by Broward County’s health 
insurer, and, unlike the scenario in Barnes, participation in 
the program was not required for health coverage.120 
Information obtained from the health screening program was 
not disclosed to Broward County, except that Broward 
County did receive de-identified aggregated data that it “may 
consider in creating future benefit plans.”121 The health 
screening data was also used to facilitate a disease 
management program.122 In 2010, Broward County decided 
to incentivize participation in the program: employees who 
declined to complete the HRA and biometric screening 
incurred a $20.00 charge on each bi-weekly paycheck.123 
Departing from the logic of Barnes, which would suggest 
an evaluation of whether the health screening program and 
the $20.00 bi-weekly incentive could appropriately be 
 
116 Id. at 1371. 
117 Referred to in the case under the broader term “wellness 
program.” Id. at 1371–72. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1372. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. Employees who completed the program and were identified by 
the insurer to have one of five disease states (asthma, hypertension, 
diabetes, congestive heart failure, or kidney disease) were given the 
opportunity to participate in a disease management coaching program and 
become eligible to receive medications at no additional cost. Id. 
123 Id. 
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considered part of developing a benefit plan “in accordance 
with accepted principles of risk assessment,”124 the court 
began its analysis by asking whether the health screening 
program itself was a “term” of a bona fide benefit plan.125 
The court concluded that it “views the wellness program as a 
term of the County’s group health plan,” based on the facts 
that (1) the insurer paid for and administered the program 
under its healthcare contract with the county, (2) only those 
enrolled in the county’s health plan could participate in the 
wellness program, and (3) the county’s benefit plan employee 
handout informed plan enrollees that they “will have to 
participate in both the Biometric Screening and online 
Health Risk Assessment.”126 
Next, as a second step, the court determined that the 
program was “based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, 
or administering risks.”127 After considering the “limited case 
law” on the meaning of this language in the safe harbor 
provision, the court concluded that the terms “collectively 
refer to the process of collecting information about the health 
of the insured in order to assess risks so the insurer may 
accurately establish premiums—in other words: the process 
of developing insurance plans.”128 Notably, the court cited to 
Barnes,129 as well as to another case from 1998, Zamora-
Quezada v. HealthTexas Med. Grp. of San Antonio.130 In 
Zamora-Quezada, the court applied interim guidance from 
the EEOC to define “underwriting” as generally referring “to 
the application of the various risk factors or risk classes to a 
 
124 Barnes v. Benham Grp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (D. Minn. 
1998). 
125 Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1373–74. 
128 Id. 
129 “Indeed, ‘[t]he purpose of the safe harbor provision is to permit the 
development and administration of benefit plans in accordance with 
accepted principles of risk assessment.’” Id. (citing Barnes v. Benham 
Grp., 22 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1020 (D. Minn. 1998)). 
130 34 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
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particular individual or group for the purposes of 
determining whether to provide coverage.”131 And “risk 
classification,” in the context of the safe harbor, “refers to the 
identification of risk factors and the groupings of those 
factors which pose similar risks.”132 As described thus far, 
the court’s recitation of statements regarding the 
interpretation of the safe harbor in this step of its analysis 
does not deviate much from the statutory language, 
legislative history, or analysis provided in Barnes and 
Zamora-Quezada. 
The court’s application of § 12201(c) to Broward County’s 
health screening program, however, if not fairly 
characterized as conclusory, journeyed away from these 
interpretive guidelines. After observing that the health 
screening program “render[ed] aggregate data to the County 
that it may analyze when developing future benefit plans,” 
the court characterized the employer’s “acting as an 
employer seeking to gather information that would be used 
to design future benefit plans” as “underwriting and 
classifying risks on a macroscopic level.”133 Further diluting 
the safe harbor provision, the court reasoned that the health 
screening program was “designed to mitigate risks,” and, 
“[l]ike the company in Barnes, Broward County acted to 
solicit medical information from its employees with a view 
toward assessing risks.”134 As the EEOC observed in the 
preamble to its final rule, adhering to the reasoning in Seff 
would make permissible any practice by an employer with 
the goal of reducing insurance costs.135 Having drawn the 
 
131 Id. at 442–43. 
132 Id. 
133 Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. 
134 Id. at 1374. “In other words, the program is based on 
underwriting, classifying, and administering risks because its ultimate 
goal is to sponsor insurance plans that maintain or lower its participant’s 
premiums.” Id. 
135 Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 31,126, 31,131 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
On appeal, the only issue raised was whether the district court erred in 
the first step of its analysis: its determination that the health screening 
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conclusion that the safe harbor protected Broward County’s 
actions, the court did not address the defendant’s alternative 
argument that the program was permissible as a voluntary 
wellness program.136 
D. Flambeau 
A few years after the decision in Seff, a court in Wisconsin 
applied a two-step analysis derived from Seff to rule that 
employers may deny health insurance coverage to employees 
who choose not to complete a health screening program.137 As 
expressed in one news article, under the ruling in EEOC v. 
Flambeau, Inc., employees might face a choice that 
essentially boils down to “take a blood test or lose your 
health coverage.”138 
In Flambeau, the EEOC contended that the defendant 
violated § 12112(d)(4)(A) by conditioning participation in its 
employee health insurance plan on the completion of an HRA 
 
program was a “term of a bona fide benefit plan.” Seff v. Broward Cty., 
Fla., 691 F.3d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012). The Eleventh Circuit upheld 
the district court’s ruling because the County’s insurance company 
“sponsored the wellness program,” “the program was only available to 
group plan enrollees,” and the County “presented the program as part of 
its group plan in at least two employee handouts.” Id. at 1224. Because the 
district court found that the health screening program and, by apparent 
implication, its associated financial incentives, fell within the ADA’s safe 
harbor provision, the Eleventh Circuit also declined to address whether 
the program imposed non-voluntary medical examinations or inquiries 
that would otherwise would have been prohibited by 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 12112(d)(4). See id. at 1221–22. 
136 Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 n.3. 
137 EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015). 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the EEOC’s claim for 
injunctive relief was moot and therefore did not resolve the question of 
how the insurance safe harbor should be interpreted. EEOC v. Flambeau, 
Inc., 846 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2017). 
138 Rebecca Greenfield, Employee Wellness Programs Not So 
Voluntary Anymore, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-15/employee-wellness-
programs-not-so-voluntary-anymore [https://perma.cc/4CEW-SWLX]. 
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and a biometric screening test.139 Despite notable similarities 
between the case in Flambeau and the case in Barnes, the 
court followed Seff in conducting its analysis of the insurance 
safe harbor.140 
In October 2010, the defendant established a health 
screening program141 for employees who wanted to enroll in 
its self-funded health insurance plan for the 2011 benefit 
year.142 Similar to the program at issue in Seff, the health 
screening program had two components: (1) an HRA, which 
required participants to complete a questionnaire about their 
medical history, diet, mental and social health, and job 
satisfaction; and (2) a biometric test, which was similar to a 
routine physical and involved height and weight 
measurements, a blood pressure test, and a blood draw.143 
Information collected through this health screening 
program was reported to the defendant in the aggregate and 
“used to identify the health risks and medical conditions 
common among the plan’s enrollees.”144 The court found that 
the defendant used this information to “estimate the cost of 
providing insurance, set participants’ premiums, evaluate 
the need for stop-loss insurance, adjust the co-pays for 
preventive exams and adjust the co-pays for certain 
prescription drugs.”145 As part of its wellness offerings, the 
defendant also sponsored other initiatives, such as weight 
loss competitions, to address the fact that a high percentage 
of its employees appeared to suffer from nutrition and weight 
 
139 Flambeau, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 851. 
140 See id. at 855–56. 
141 Like the case in Seff, the health screening program comprised one 
component of a wellness program and is referred to in the case under the 
broader term “wellness program.” Id. at 851. 
142 Flambeau, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 852. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. The EEOC argued it did not. See, e.g., Opening Brief of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Appellant at 30–31, 
EEOC v. Flambeau, 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-1402). 
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management problems.146 For the 2011 benefit year, the 
defendant promoted its health screening program by 
providing a $600 reward to employees if they completed the 
HRA and biometric test, but in 2012 and 2013, the defendant 
eliminated the $600 credit and instead offered health 
insurance only to employees who completed the health 
screening program.147 
At this point, the facts of this case could be analogized to 
the facts in Barnes, and the court might have applied the 
analysis of Barnes to hold, for instance, that the safe harbor 
creates an exception to the ADA’s general restrictions such 
that the statute does not prohibit an employer’s requiring 
employees to complete medical questionnaires (and, in this 
case, biometric tests) when the requested medical 
information is sought for the purpose of developing a bona 
fide health insurance plan (in this case, a self-insured plan). 
Instead, the court attempted to follow the analytical steps in 
Seff. 
First, the court determined that the wellness program 
requirement was a “term” of defendant’s benefit plan 
because (1) employees were required to complete the 
wellness program before they could enroll in the plan, and 
“[i]t is difficult to fathom how such a condition could be 
anything other than a plan term,” (2) defendant distributed 
handouts to employees informing them of the wellness 
program requirement, and (3) the plan’s “summary plan 
description explained that participants would be required to 
enroll ‘in the manner and form prescribed by [defendant].’”148 
Second, the court concluded that the wellness program 
requirement was “based on underwriting risks, classifying 
risks, or administering such risks.”149 Following the court in 
Seff, the court in Flambeau observed that, based on the 
“limited case law,” these terms refer “simply to the process of 
 
146 Flambeau, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 852. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 855. 
149 Id. at 856. 
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developing an insurance plan.”150 The court found that the 
“undisputed evidence establishes that defendant’s 
consultants used the data gathered through the wellness 
program to classify plan participants’ health risks and 
calculate defendant’s projected insurance costs for the 
benefit year” and to provide recommendations regarding 
plan “premiums.”151 Additionally, the defendant used the 
wellness program data in reaching its decision to purchase 
stop-loss insurance.152 The court reasoned that such 
decisions “are a fundamental part of developing and 
administering an insurance plan and therefore fall squarely 
within the scope of the safe harbor.”153 
The EEOC raised several objections to the court’s Seff-
inspired analysis,154 but setting aside the problems with the 
court’s application of § 12201(c) based on a questionable 
framework of analysis, the facts as found by the court and its 
reasoning within the second step of its analysis are 
analogous to the facts and analysis in Barnes. The EEOC 
itself has argued in litigation, for instance, that the “safe 
harbor applies when an employer or insurance company 
seeks to underwrite an insurance policy by requiring 
employees to answer disability-related questions so that the 
premium can be calculated,” and when the employer is 
otherwise “engaging in a function of the insurance 
industry.”155 Therefore, the ultimate outcome of the district 
court’s analysis in Flambeau, if not the pathway to it, 







154 See id. at 853–55. 
155 EEOC’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 2–3, EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., No. 14-1019, 2016 WL 
5107019, (E.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2016). 
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E. The EEOC’s Response to Seff and Flambeau 
In its proposed rule, the EEOC briefly noted its opposition 
to Seff, stating that it did not believe that the safe harbor, as 
interpreted by the court in Seff, “is the proper basis for 
finding wellness program incentives permissible.”156 The 
EEOC argued that the ADA “contains a clear ‘safe harbor’ for 
wellness programs [§ 12112(d)(4)(B)] . . . Reading the 
insurance safe harbor as exempting these programs from 
coverage would render the ‘voluntary’ provision 
superfluous.”157 In its final rule, the EEOC expounded on 
these arguments and its position on the insurance safe 
harbor in the preamble and its interpretive guidance,158 and 
further added an explicit provision in its regulations stating 
that the safe harbor provisions “applicable to health 
insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not 
apply to wellness programs, even if such plans are part of a 
covered entity’s health plan.”159 
As the EEOC noted in the preamble to its final rule, the 
doctrine devised in Seff and applied in Flambeau “seems to 
endorse an almost limitless application of the safe harbor 
provision,”160 and taken together, these cases do appear to 
supply strands of reasoning with the potential to unravel the 
prohibition of § 12112(d)(4)(A) entirely. Under these cases, a 
health screening program can meet the requirement of the 
first step, i.e., can qualify as a “term” of an employer’s 
benefit plan, if the wellness program is required for 
enrollment and this requirement is described in employee 
 
156 Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,659, 21,662 n.24 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
157 Id. 
158 See Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,129–31, 31,143 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
159 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (2016). 
160 Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 31,131. 
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handouts.161 Next, the health screening program can meet 
the requirement of the second step, i.e., can qualify as “based 
on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering 
such risks” so long as data from the health screening 
program is used in the process of developing an insurance 
plan, and Seff suggests a broad interpretation of § 12201(c) 
under which such process encompasses efforts by an 
employer to mitigate risks.162 Since, almost by definition, 
health screening programs provide data that facilitate efforts 
to mitigate health risks, essentially the logic of Seff and 
Flambeau provides that any health screening program can 
be required precisely because it is required and a health 
screening program. 
The EEOC’s new regulation is a direct reaction to the 
applications of the safe harbor in Seff and Flambeau, and is 
an effort to prevent employers from justifying incentives 
used in wellness programs by arguing that reducing risks 
and estimating health care costs fall within the categories of 
activities permitted by § 12201(c).163 In other words, 
“wellness programs” are not “terms of a benefit plan based 
on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering 
such risks.” In its interpretive guidance and in the preamble 
to its final rule, the EEOC also offered a view into the types 
of activities that could fall within the safe harbor when it 
argued, for instance, that “[i]n neither Seff nor Flambeau did 
the employer or its health plan use wellness program data to 
determine insurability or to calculate insurance rates based 
on risks associated with certain conditions—the practices the 
safe harbor provision was intended to permit.”164 
 
161 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra notes 127–136 and accompanying text. 
163 See Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. at 31,143. “[The safe harbor] does not apply simply because a 
covered entity asserts that it used information collected as part of a 
wellness program to estimate, or to try to reduce, its risks or health care 
costs.” Id. 
164 Id. at 31,131; see also EEOC’s Final Rule on Employer Wellness 
Programs and Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL 
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F. Orion 
Only a couple of months after the EEOC issued its new 
regulations, another court in Wisconsin ruled on the 
permissibility of an employer’s requirement that employees 
complete a health screening program, upholding the 
retroactive application of the EEOC’s new regulation.165 In 
EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., the court further 
concluded that the safe harbor would not apply to the 
defendant’s wellness program regardless of the applicability 
of the EEOC’s regulation, vindicating the arguments 
underlying the EEOC’s new rule.166 Yet, surprisingly, the 
court held that the employer’s shifting of 100% of the 
premium equivalent to employees who declined to 
participate in the wellness program did not render the 
program involuntary. The court reasoned that “even a strong 
incentive is still no more than an incentive,” and therefore 
the program was permissible under § 12112(d)(4)(B).167 Since 
the EEOC’s new rules regarding wellness incentives became 
effective on January 1, 2017, employers will not be able to 
set future wellness incentives in reliance on this holding.168 
 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/qanda-
ada-wellness-final-rule.cfm [https://perma.cc/QT3H-P94D] (last visited 
March 15, 2017). “The ADA’s safe harbor provision allows insurers and 
plan sponsors (including employers) to use information, including 
actuarial data, about risks posed by certain health conditions to make 
decisions about insurability and about the cost of insurance. . . . The safe 
harbor provision does not apply to employer wellness programs, since 
employers are not collecting or using information to determine whether 
employees with certain health conditions are insurable or to set insurance 
premiums.” Id. 
165 EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-1019, 2016 WL 
5107019, at *1, *4–6 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 19, 2016) (discussing the EEOC’s 
rulemaking authority, applying Chevron deference to the EEOC’s safe 
harbor regulation, and concluding that the regulation applies 
retroactively). 
166 Id. at *6–8. 
167 Id. at *8. 
168 Id. (explaining that, under the EEOC’s new regulation, “[i]f an 
employer wishes to incentivize or penalize employees’ participation, the 
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As this Note will explore, however, the court in Orion left a 
critical set of arguments on the table for employers seeking 
to continue utilizing HRAs and biometric screenings in the 
same manner as was at issue in Seff, Flambeau, and Orion—
arguments pertaining to the precise application of the 
prohibition in § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
In Orion, the EEOC brought an action against the 
employer alleging that it violated the ADA by requiring 
employees who elected to enroll in its self-insured health 
insurance plan to either complete a health screening 
program or pay 100% of the monthly premium equivalent 
amount.169 The health screening program consisted of “a 
health history questionnaire and biometric screen involving 
a blood pressure check, height, weight, and body 
circumference measurement, and blood draw and 
analysis.”170 Like the employers in Seff and Flambeau, Orion 
only received information from its health screening program 
in the form of anonymous, aggregated data that “allowed 
Orion to see the percentage of participants in its plan who 
had particular health risks such as high cholesterol.”171 
Orion argued that its wellness program did not violate 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) for three reasons: (1) the safe harbor 
 
program remains voluntary if the employer provides a financial incentive 
at or below thirty percent of the total cost for self-only coverage,” but 
noting that “the EEOC does not maintain those aspects of the regulation 
apply retroactively”). 
169 Id. at *1–2. In 2008, Orion decided to switch from a fully-insured 
health plan to a self-insured plan and began exploring the use of wellness 
programs, ultimately implementing a wellness program that required 
employees to, among other things, complete a health screening program at 
the beginning of the insurance year or pay the entire monthly premium 
equivalent. Id. This amount was equivalent to $413.43 for single coverage 
and $1,130.83 for family coverage. Id. at *2. 
170 Id. The case refers to the health screening program as a “health 
risk assessment.” Id. 
171 Id. “Orion did not receive any personally identified information as 
a result of the HRA. Instead, the questionnaire and blood samples were 
collected by one vendor (Holy Family Memorial) and sent directly to 
another vendor (Clinical Reference Lab) with scores then compiled and 
aggregated by another vendor (Healics).” Id. 
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applied; (2) Orion did not “make inquiries” as prohibited by 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) because it only received anonymous, 
aggregated data; and (3) the wellness program was voluntary 
as employees had a choice regarding whether to 
participate.172 As mentioned, the court declined to apply the 
safe harbor, instead finding the wellness incentives 
permissible under § 12112(d)(4)(B). In its analysis of the 
proper application of the insurance safe harbor, the court 
explained, “the wellness program was not used to 
underwrite, classify, or administer risk.”173 Instead, Orion 
claimed that the purpose of receiving data from the health 
screening program was “to identify common health issues 
and offer employees educational tools or assistance to 
improve their health,”174 and that it “did not use the 
information it obtained through the wellness initiative to 
determine the premiums it would charge or determine 
coverage under the health benefit plan.”175 Orion had 
additionally argued that § 12201(c)(3), the third prong of the 
insurance safe harbor applicable to self-insured employers, 
applied to its actions, and, since § 12201(c)(3) does not 
include the language of “underwriting risks, classifying 
risks, or administering such risks,” employers with self-
insured plans do not need to show that their actions are 
based on underwriting or classification of risks.176 In its 
analysis of the safe harbor provisions, however, the court did 
not appear to directly address this argument.177 
Having resolved the case using § 12112(d)(4)(B), the court 
declined to address Orion’s remaining alternative 
 
172 Id. at *4. 
173 Id. at *7. 
174 Id. at *2. 
175 Id. at *7. 
176 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 15–16, EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-
CV-1019, 2015 WL 11197964 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2015). 
177 See Orion, 2016 WL 5107019, at *6 (quoting instead §§ 12201(c)(1) 
and (2)). 
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argument.178 Orion had argued that its health screening 
program did not consist of unlawful medical examinations or 
disability-related inquiries under § 12112(d)(4)(A) because it 
never received its employee’s individual results.179 To 
support this argument, Orion reasoned that the purpose of 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition is to prevent employers from 
identifying disabled persons, and that this concern is not 
implicated if the employer only obtains anonymous 
aggregated data.180 As further support, Orion cited Patten v. 
State,181 a recent case from the Court of Appeals of Oregon 
that held that an employer did not “make inquiries” 
regarding disabilities by asking employees to complete an 
HRA when the employer only received aggregated, de-
identified data.182 In its resolution of a case directly 
comparable to Barnes, Seff, and Flambeau, therefore, the 
court in Patten honed in on a point of interpretation taken 
for granted in other cases: whether a health screening 
requirement actually violates § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition 
such that it requires an exemption under another provision 
of the ADA, such as § 12112(d)(4)(B) or § 12201(c). Taking 
the view of the court in Patten, for instance, the court in 
Barnes might have resolved the case without reference to 
§ 12201(c). Instead, the court might have reasoned that the 
employer did not “make inquiries of an employee as to 
whether such employee is an individual with a disability”183 
as the employer was only asking that its employees provide 
medical information to an insurance provider and was not 
itself acquiring that information.184 
 
178 Id. at *4 & n.1. 
179 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 176, at 16. 
180 Id. at 18. 
181 359 P.3d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), review denied sub nom. Van 
Patten v. State, 368 P.3d 26 (Or. 2016). 
182 See id. at 482–84. 
183 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). 
184 See Barnes v. Benham Grp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1017 (D. Minn. 
1998) (explaining how the insurance enrollment forms were collected). 
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G. Distillation of Issues 
The safe harbor protects disability-related distinctions in 
health insurance that are actuarially justified and “based on 
bona fide risk classification,”185 and disability-related 
inquiries and medical exams may be utilized in the 
insurance underwriting process. When the court in Seff 
stated that the safe harbor provisions “collectively refer to 
the process of collecting information about the health of the 
insured in order to assess risks so the insurer may 
accurately establish premiums—in other words: the process 
of developing insurance plans,”186 it elided a core inference in 
its analysis. More precisely, the language of the safe harbor 
refers to the actions of underwriting, classifying, and 
administering risks, and of establishing terms of a bona fide 
health insurance plan—courts have inferred that the process 
of collecting health information from insured employees is an 
implicit component of these insurance activities and 
therefore have, to various extents, concluded that the safe 
harbor also protects activities involving medical exams and 
inquiries. 
As reflected in the discussion above, the question of 
whether and how the safe harbor “should apply to wellness 
programs” has produced inconsistent answers. As a response 
to the flawed framework in Seff, the EEOC’s new rule in 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) seems clear: the safe harbor provisions 
“do not apply” to “wellness programs” in the way that Seff 
and Flambeau applied those provisions to wellness 
programs.187 Yet, though the EEOC presented this 
repudiation “in no uncertain terms,”188 framing the issue as 
simply one of whether the safe harbor provisions “do not 
apply”189 or “shall apply”190 to “wellness programs” glosses 
 
185 See supra Section III.A. 
186 Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
187 See supra Section III.E. 
188 EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-1019, 2016 WL 
5107019, at *4. 
189 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (2016). 
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over the heart of the controversy: the different constructions 
of the safe harbor discussed above ultimately boil down to 
differences in opinion as to how closely disability-related 
inquiries and medical exams must be related to the 
development of bona fide insurance plans to fall within the 
ambit of § 12201(c). It cannot be that the safe harbor protects 
all medical inquiries and exams that could conceivably 
become part of decisionmaking for an employer considering 
health insurance options (as suggested by the decision in 
Seff)—otherwise, the safe harbor would entirely engulf the 
prohibition of § 12112(d)(4)(A). Yet, some medical inquiries 
are essential enough to bona fide risk classification to justify 
gaining the protection of § 12201(c) (as evidenced by the 
decision in Barnes);191 the ADA does not disrupt how the 
insurance industry does business.192 
Though § 1630.14(d)(6) rejects the holdings of Seff and 
Flambeau, it does not appear to disturb the problematic way 
in which the courts and parties have framed the questions 
presented by these cases. Additionally, it appears to rest on 
an assumption that employers and insurers do not use data 
from health screening programs, which may be components 
of broader wellness programs, in the underwriting process.193 
As such, the new rule does not fully address the complexities 
posed by factual scenarios such as the one in Flambeau, 
which presented a test case apt for the development of a 
nuanced analysis of the limits of and overlaps between the 
provisions in § 12112(d)(4) and § 12201(c). A comparison of 
the facts in Flambeau and those in Barnes illuminates some 
of the open questions that ought to be addressed in order to 
formulate a comprehensive and coherent doctrine respecting 
the safe harbor’s application to health screening programs. 
In its resolution of the case, the court in Flambeau might 
have offered, for instance, an analysis of the salient 
 
190 Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th 
Cong. § 3(a)(1)(C) (2017). 
191 See supra Section III.B. 
192 See supra note 100. 
193 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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distinctions between Flambeau and Barnes—the facts that 
the employer in Flambeau offered a self-insured plan, 
required employees to complete a biometric screening in 
addition to a health questionnaire, and used the data from 
its health screening program in conjunction with its wellness 
management offerings instead of solely for the development 
of its health plan—to determine whether these distinctions 
do or should qualify the applicability of the safe harbor to a 
health screening program. This opportunity was lost, 
however, when the court proceeded in the wake of the 
reasoning in Seff. 
An additional wrinkle is the issue of how to apply 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) in cases where the employer does not receive 
individualized medical information about its employees—an 
argument left on the table by the court in Orion. Though the 
parties in Patten agreed that the financial incentives 
attached to the HRA in that case rendered participation in 
the HRA “involuntary,”194 the court held that the HRA did 
not pose disability-related inquiries as a threshold matter 
and therefore did not violate § 12112(d)(4)(A). Essentially, 
employers in cases like Seff and Flambeau, who only receive 
de-identified aggregate data from their health screening 
programs, could attempt to use the line of argument 
advanced in Patten to sidestep entirely questions of whether 
their health screening programs are “voluntary” under 
§ 12112(d)(4)(B) or breach the maximum allowable 
incentives set forth by the EEOC’s new regulation. The next 
Part begins with an analysis of this issue before proceeding 
to outline a framework for determining the extent to which 
 
194 Patten v. State, 359 P.3d 469, 472 (2015), review denied sub nom. 
Van Patten v. State, 368 P.3d 26 (2016) (“Although an employee’s 
eligibility for state sponsored health insurance does not depend on 
whether the employee has completed the assessment, those who do not 
complete it pay more for their insurance than those who do. The difference 
is currently $17.50 per month for individuals or $35.00 per month for 
couples. Nonparticipants also currently have a deductible that is $100.00 
larger than participants. The parties agree that, because of this financial 
disincentive, participation in the assessment is not ‘voluntary’ as that 
term is defined in the ADA.”). 
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the provisions of the safe harbor provide protection to 
medical inquiries and exams comprising health screening 
programs. 
IV. INTERPRETING § 12112(D)(4)(A)’S 
PROHIBITION AND NAVIGATING THE 
INSURANCE SAFE HARBOR 
This Part of the Note begins by addressing Orion’s and 
the EEOC’s arguments in the Orion case about the proper 
interpretation of § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition on disability-
related inquiries and medical examinations, and outlines a 
construction of the provision in light of the text, legislative 
history, and purpose of the ADA. This Part then analyzes 
how a proposed construction of § 12112(d)(4)(A) and 
§ 12201(c) would apply to the type of wellness programs at 
issue in cases such as Seff, Flambeau, and Orion, and 
identifies possible concerns with how wellness programs will 
be implemented and designed in the future. 
A. Interpreting § 12112(d)(4)(A) 
The ADA provides that a “covered entity shall not require 
a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an 
employee as to whether such employee is an individual with 
a disability.”195 The court in Patten confronted the question 
of whether the defendants did “make inquiries” regarding 
disabilities, despite the fact that neither defendant ever 
received any individual employee responses from the HRA at 
issue.196 After noting that “[n]either the parties nor we have 
found precedent from any jurisdiction, or any other source, 
examining the precise question at issue here,”197 the court 
proceeded to construct an interpretation of § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s 
language based on the overall statutory scheme and 
 
195 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012); see supra notes 56–63 and 
accompanying text. 
196 Patten, 359 P.3d 473–74. 
197 Id. at 473. 
CHE – FINAL  
328 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
 
purposes of the ADA.198 While the HRA at issue undeniably 
asked employees to answer questions, the court reasoned 
that it was ambiguous whether those questions were 
“‘inquiries’ in the unique circumstances of an anonymous 
health assessment questionnaire.”199 The court determined 
that the plaintiffs’ interpretation that the HRA fell within 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibited “inquiries” did not align with 
the purpose of the ADA’s “overall statutory scheme” to 
prevent employers from discriminating against persons who 
are disabled.200 The court concluded that “the ADA governs 
relationships between employers and employee” and 
“banning the flow of information between employees and 
third parties who are not employers” “introduces a foreign 
and extraneous concept.”201 Therefore, according to the court, 
the plaintiffs appeared to be attempting to “conscript [the 
ADA] to their own uses instead of the uses which motivated 
Congress to enact it.”202 
In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the 
dictionary definition of “inquiry,” which it reported to be “the 
act or an instance of seeking truth, information, or 
knowledge about something.”203 The court reasoned that if an 
entity asks a question it knows it will not receive a response 
to, then it “makes no sense to regard the questioner as 
‘seeking’ truth, information or knowledge about anything.”204 
To illustrate its logic, the court suggested that “[b]y analogy, 
a person requesting that a friend donate money to a charity 
cannot be said to be ‘seeking’ that money, because the person 
has no expectation of receiving it.”205 The soundness of this 
analysis of the dictionary definition and the suitability of the 
analogy is debatable; the defendants used the aggregated 
 
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 473–74. 
200 Id. at 474. 
201 Id.  
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 473–74. 
204 Id. at 474. 
205 Id. 
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results of the health screening program and implemented it 
with the aim of “encourag[ing] employees to adopt beneficial 
health habits, thereby, presumably, reducing insurance 
costs,”206 so perhaps it would be more apt to analogize their 
actions to “a person requesting that a friend donate money to 
a charity” for a cause that directly benefits that person—this 
person has no expectation of receiving the money but expects 
to receive benefits from the donation nonetheless. The 
defendants in this case, and in the foregoing cases, were 
seeking to have employees provide personal health 
information for the employers’ purposes (e.g., to reduce 
health costs), though they used third party entities to handle 
the information. 
It is undeniable that the statutory language, which 
prohibits inquiries “of an employee as to whether such 
employee is an individual with a disability,”207 could 
accommodate an interpretation that the receipt per se by an 
employer of aggregated, de-identified information from an 
HRA does not fall within the scope of § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s 
prohibition. This conclusion is further supported by the 
ADA’s legislative history, which indicates that the 
prohibitions on disability-related inquiries in § 12112(d) 
were motivated by a concern that even identification alone of 
a disability could serve to stigmatize a person with a 
disability.208 Congressional reports provide as an example 
that “the individual with cancer may object merely to being 
identified, independent of the consequences.”209 Arguably, if 
an employer has no access to individually identifiable 
medical information, a request for aggregated, anonymous 
data is not a question “likely to elicit information about a 
disability”210 with respect to individual employees. 
 
206 Id. at 472 (explaining that the aggregated results were used “to 
help in the design of future health plan offerings”). 
207 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). 
208 E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 75 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357. 
209 Id. 
210 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 60. 
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In its motion for summary judgment, Orion attempted to 
supplement the reasoning in Patten by arguing that 
§ 12112(d)(4)(C), regarding the confidentiality of information 
obtained under § 12112(d)(4)(B), would be “rendered 
superfluous unless the prohibitions on medical examinations 
and inquiries only applied if the employer receives the 
results.”211 Orion reasoned that § 12112(d)’s prohibitions 
necessarily imply the employer will obtain individual 
medical results because “otherwise there would be no need to 
require by statute that the results be treated on a 
confidential basis and kept in a separate employee medical 
file.”212 This argument is flawed since applying 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition to cover actions involving both 
types of information collection would not neutralize the need 
to provide confidentiality protections for instances where an 
employer collects individually identifiable information. Even 
so, § 12112(d)(4)(C) does lend some additional support to the 
position that § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition is directed at the 
use or acquisition by an employer of individually identifiable 
health information, and the pure act of acquiring aggregated, 
de-identified information therefore should not be considered 
an “inquiry” under § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
But even if the receipt of aggregated, anonymous health 
information is not itself a violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A), to 
characterize the actions of the employers in Patten and Orion 
as simply such would be devious. In its opposition to Orion’s 
motion for summary judgment, for instance, the EEOC 
argued that, even if the acquisition by an employer of 
aggregated data does not qualify as an “inquiry,” “Orion’s 
agent that compiled the aggregate information indisputably 
had access to the individualized medical data,” and since the 
ADA defines employer to include “any agent of such person,” 
 
211 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 176, at 17. 
212 Id. 
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Orion’s actions violated § 12112(d)(4)(A).213 Insofar as Orion’s 
wellness program vendors had no power to affect 
employment decisions, an employer could argue that it would 
be improper to consider them “agents” for the purpose of 
bringing them within § 12111(5)(A)’s definition of 
“employer.”214 However, whether or not the wellness vendors 
are “agents” for purposes of being subject to liability under 
the ADA, the employers in these cases did not only receive 
aggregated employee health data but also directed the 
collection, albeit by third party administrators, of the 
individualized health information. Perhaps an employer’s 
making any request of employees to provide personal 
medical information to any entity, employer or not, should 
fall within § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition.215 In short, it does 
not necessarily flow from the premise that the receipt of 
aggregated, de-identified information does not violate 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) that therefore there is no issue under 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) whenever there has been such receipt, 
regardless of other facts—such as whether the information 
was used in some way on behalf of the employer or to serve 
the employer’s purposes in ways that result in the disparate 
treatment of disabled persons. 
 
213 EEOC’s Memorandum in Opposition to Orion’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 20, EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., No. 14-1019, 2016 
WL 5107019 (E.D. Wis. January 4, 2016) (emphasis added). 
214 See, e.g., Satterfield v. Tennessee, 295 F.3d 611, 615–19 (6th Cir. 
2002) (discussing the meaning of “agent”). 
215 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012) (providing that to “discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes 
“participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that 
has the effect of subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant or 
employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this 
subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment 
or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits 
to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training 
and apprenticeship programs)”); Satterfield, 295 F.3d at 618 (noting that 
employers “do not escape their legal obligations under the ADA by 
contracting out certain hiring and personnel functions to third parties”). 
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The “overall statutory scheme” of the ADA centers on 
preventing disability-related discrimination, as the court in 
Patten observed,216 but the language of § 12112(d)(4)(A) 
reflects a decision by Congress to go further—Congress chose 
to prophylactically restrict the means for attaining employee 
health information, rather than just the acquisition of 
individually identifiable information by the employer. The 
exception provided in § 12112(d)(4) is not simply that an 
employee’s medical information be kept confidential;217 the 
statute also requires that “acceptable examinations and 
inquiries” be voluntary and part of an employee health 
program, as well as that information obtained from such 
acceptable examinations and inquiries be treated as 
confidential medical records.218 The particular phrase “make 
inquiries” might be susceptible to multiple constructions,219 
but “[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have 
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of 
each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take 
their purport from the setting in which they are used.”220 
Though the court in Patten duly noted that a court should 
interpret statutory language “in their context,” it did not 
appear to analyze the statutory context of the provision in 
 
216 Patten v. State, 359 P.3d 469, 474 (2015), review denied sub nom. 
Van Patten v. State, 368 P.3d 26 (2016). 
217 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012) (providing that employers “may 
require a medical examination after an offer of employment has been 
made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement of the employment 
duties of such applicant” if, among other requirements, the information 
obtained regarding the applicant’s medical condition or history “is treated 
as a confidential medical record”). 
218 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B), (C) (2012); 
219 See, e.g., EEOC’s Memorandum in Opposition to Orion’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 213, at 19–20; Defendant’s Reply 
Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 
11–12, EEOC v. Orion, 208 F. Supp. 3d 989 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 14-cv-
1019). 
220 King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (explaining 
the “cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole”); see also, e.g., 
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of 
definitional possibilities but of statutory context.”). 
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reaching its conclusion that the term “inquiries” is 
“ambiguous.”221 A holistic and internally consistent reading 
of the provisions of § 12112(d)(4) would recognize that the 
provisions together, first, prohibit employers from requiring 
that employees complete medical examinations, 
“including . . . medical histories,”222 and from asking 
questions about an employee’s health, and, second, 
enumerate a particular exception for voluntary medical 
examinations and voluntary medical histories that are part 
of an employee health program. The notion, meanwhile, that 
an implicit exception to the prohibition in § 12112(d)(4)(A) 
arises when the employer receives information from medical 
inquiries only in the aggregate contradicts the specifically 
enumerated requirements of the exception in § 12112(d)(4)223 
and implies an inconsistent application of the statute to 
medical inquiries as opposed to medical examinations, the 
explanation or support for which is not readily apparent 
based on the statutory language and context of 
§ 12112(d)(4)’s provisions.224 
Moreover, if concerns about the potential stigma from 
identification alone motivated the creation of 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A),225 it is difficult to argue that collecting 
personal health information in order to facilitate targeted 
wellness offerings, for instance, would not implicate concerns 
of the same quality and degree simply because the employer 
itself does not receive individually identifiable information. 
For example, a health screening program that requires 
employees who do not “pass” a biometric screening test 
involving height, blood pressure, body mass index, blood 
sugar, and cholesterol measurements to take a “multi-week 
online health-improvement course” or pay an extra $600 per 
 
221 See Patten, 359 P.3d at 473–74 (appearing instead to interpret 
“context” as the specific factual circumstances of a case).  
222 § 12112(d)(4)(B). 
223 §§ 12112(d)(4)(B), (C). 
224 See § 12112(d)(4)(A); cf. § 12112(d)(4)(2) (carving out an exception 
for acceptable preemployment inquiries but not medical examinations). 
225 See supra notes 208–209 and accompanying text. 
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year for health insurance226 may just as effectively 
stigmatize employees even though, technically, an employer 
could assert that its wellness vendor is the entity conducting 
the program and handling the information, and therefore the 
employer itself has not directly identified the health issues of 
any one employee.227 
The interpretation of “inquiries” advanced by the court in 
Patten would further produce an absurd result whereby 
§ 12112(d)(4)(B)’s requirements for medical exams and 
inquiries that are part of an employee health program would 
have no application at all so long as an employer uses 
wellness vendors to carry out those medical exams and 
inquiries that are part of an employee health program. In 
other words, extending the logic of the holding in Patten, an 
employer might argue that an HRA does not run into the 
prohibition on disability-related inquiries in § 12112(d)(4)(A) 
if the employer does not receive individualized information 
from the HRA, and therefore, the wellness program would 
not be subject at all to the incentive limits that the EEOC’s 
new regulations place on participatory wellness programs. 
An even bolder employer might attempt to argue that even 
where it requires employees to undergo biometric screening, 
e.g., blood tests or in-person medical exams, it would not 
violate § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s prohibition on requiring medical 
examinations if it does not acquire the personal health 
information of its employees as a result,228 though this 
 
226 Anderson, supra note 30 (providing a personal anecdote about 
such a health screening program). 
227 Cf. Madison, supra note 1, at 422–23 (“One scholar has suggested 
that the focus on individual responsibility for health ‘creates new “health 
deviants” and stigmatizes individuals for certain unhealthy lifestyles’ and 
can lead to ‘victim-blaming responses,’ even when factors beyond 
individuals’ control may contribute to a failure to meet program 
objectives.”). Employees might also be justifiably concerned that an 
employer could nonetheless draw conclusions from anonymized data or 
combine such data with information about other sources to make 
inferences about their health. 
228 See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 219, at 12 (“[I]f Congress 
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argument would be quite difficult to make in light of the 
plain language of the provision; even if there is ambiguity 
with respect to the meaning of “make inquiries,” the statute 
clearly states an employer “shall not require a medical 
examination.”229 
The language of an analogous provision in GINA might 
inform on how the language of § 12112(d)(4)(A) could be 
clarified to speak more clearly to the types of wellness 
program practices commonly found at present. GINA 
provides that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to request, require, or purchase genetic 
information with respect to an employee or a family member 
of the employee . . . .”230 While this language falls under a 
section entitled “Acquisition of genetic information,” the 
exception in § 2000ff-1(b)(2) suggests that the drafters 
considered a request for an employee to provide genetic 
information to a third party to fall under this prohibition. 
Specifically, § 2000ff-1(b)(2) states that an employer may 
request genetic information where the employer is offering a 
wellness program, but only if (1) the employee provides 
“prior, knowing, voluntary, and written authorization,” (2) 
only the employee and health professional involved in 
providing the services of the wellness program receive 
individually identifiable information, and (3) any 
individually identifiable information is not disclosed to the 
employer except in aggregate terms.231 The components of 
this exception suggest that the drafters of GINA specifically 
considered a situation wherein an employer requests an 
employee participate in a wellness program and only 
 
desired to make it unlawful under the ADA to request a medical 
examination . . . it knows to use the term ‘request.’ When Congress uses 
the term ‘require’ like in the ADA’s § 12112(d)(4)(A), Congress is making 
unlawful the next step in the process—obtaining the results of the medical 
examination and inquiry—not the prior step in the process (requesting the 
medical examination).”). 
229 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). 
230 42 U.S.C.§ 2000ff-1(b) (2012). 
231 § 2000ff-1(b)(2). 
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receives data from the wellness program in aggregate terms, 
and still chose to explicitly require that the provision of 
genetic information by the employee be voluntary. GINA is a 
separate law from the ADA, but the EEOC could consider 
issuing interpretive guidance or clarifying rules providing 
that §§ 12112(d)(4)(A) and (B) should be read together to 
impose the same manner of requirements and restrictions on 
employers as GINA’s prohibitions do in the context of 
prohibiting employment discrimination based on genetic 
information.232 
In sum, the plain language of the ADA, its legislative 
history, and logic do not comfortably comport with the 
holding of Patten. This analysis suggests that the 
determination of whether there is an issue under 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) should not hinge on the nature of an 
employer’s receipt of information; instead, if an employer 
requires employees to complete a medical examination or 
health questionnaire so that their personal health 
information can be collected and used for an employer-
sponsored program, for whatever purpose, the employer has 
made an “inquiry” that it must justify, such as by arguing 
that the inquiry meets the requirements of §§ 12112(d)(4)(B) 
and (C) or that it is protected by the safe harbor provisions in 
§ 12201(c). The foregoing arguments suggest that an 
employer should not escape the ambit of § 12112(d)(4)(A) 
solely by asserting that it received health screening data 
 
232 Ironically, a potential counterargument to this proposal is 
contained in the EEOC’s own briefing in Orion. The EEOC argued, citing 
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-3(b), that “[t]he ADA bars requests for medical 
information and examinations, not just acquisition of the information. 
Congress knew how to prohibit acquisition of information if that is what it 
intended to do.” EEOC’s Memorandum in Opposition to Orion’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 213, at 21. It is not at all clear the 
mileage provided by this argument considering that § 2000ff-3(b) contains 
the word “request.” Ultimately, the question boils down to whether 
“request[ing] . . . information with respect to an employee” means or 
should carry the same meaning as “[making] inquiries of an employee,” 
and whether that meaning prohibits only the collection of information or 
also the direction of collection of such information. 
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only in aggregated, de-identified terms. At the same time, 
however, an employer would be standing on strong ground in 
arguing that the pure receipt of aggregated, de-identified 
health information does not run afoul of § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
Indeed, an employer could cite to the EEOC’s new 
regulations and interpretive guidance, which provide that 
information collected by a wellness program may be provided 
to an ADA covered entity in aggregate terms that do not 
disclose, or are not reasonably likely to disclose, the identity 
of any employee,”233 and there are “no restrictions on the 
use/disclosure of health information that has been de-
identified in accordance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.”234 
The employer would still need, however, to find an 
exemption in the ADA for the act of asking an employee to 
complete an HRA or a biometric screening. One possibility is 
§ 12112(d)(4)(B), under which the employer would be 
required to comply with the wellness incentive limits set 
forth in the EEOC’s new regulations. Another possibility, as 
the next Section explores in more detail, is inuring the 
requests under § 12201(c), the insurance safe harbor. 
B. Navigating the Insurance Safe Harbor 
The EEOC sought in its final rule to foreclose any 
application of the insurance safe harbor as occurred in Seff 
and Flambeau through a regulatory provision declaring that: 
“The ‘safe harbor’ provisions . . . applicable to health 
insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not 
apply to wellness programs, even if such plans are part of a 
covered entity’s health plan.”235 This Section offers a more 
nuanced navigation of the safe harbor. 
The framework of analysis suggested here for 
determining whether a health screening program qualifies 
for the protection of § 12201(c) begins with the question of 
whether construing the ADA to prohibit or restrict a health 
 
233 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(4)(iii) (2016). 
234 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.14(d)(4) (2016). 
235 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (2016). 
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screening program would prohibit or restrict an insurer or 
employer (or other entity specified in § 12201(c)) from 
conducting the activities specified in the safe harbor 
provisions.236 Orienting the issue in this manner perhaps 
seems like an obvious proposition, but this is not quite how 
the question has been framed in the safe harbor cases 
discussed above. With respect to the health questionnaire in 
Barnes, for example, the court might have reasoned that 
construing the ADA to prohibit the questionnaire would have 
prohibited or restricted the insurer from underwriting and 
classifying risks and interfered with the way the insurance 
industry does business, contravening the first provision in 
the insurance safe harbor, § 12201(c)(1). The court couched 
its analysis, instead, in statements about the purpose of the 
health questionnaire and its alignment with the purpose of 
the insurance safe harbor (“to permit the development and 
administration of benefit plans in accordance with accepted 
principles of risk assessment”).237 Later, in Seff, the court 
cited this language to conclude that the language of 
§ 12201(c) refers to “the process of developing insurance 
plans.”238 Since the defendant in Seff could use the health 
screening data to “develop” and “design” future benefit plans, 
the court held that the health screening program was 
protected by the safe harbor. 239 Carried by this language, the 
application of the safe harbor in Seff drifted away from the 
lifting of prohibitions under the ADA in a limited manner—
solely to permit activities essential to the provision of 
insurance—to the permitting of activities broadly relatable 
 
236 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012) (“Subchapters I through III of this 
chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict 
. . . .”). 
237 Barnes v. Benham Grp., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (D. Minn. 
1998); see supra text accompanying notes 110–114. 
238 Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011), 
aff'd sub nom. Seff v. Broward Cty., Fla., 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012); 
see supra text accompanying notes 127–132. 
239 See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1374; see supra text accompanying 
notes 133–136. 
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to the process of establishing an insurance plan. This 
constituted an improper expansion of the safe harbor.240 
In circumstances involving an insured health insurance 
plan, the first and second prongs of the insurance safe 
harbor are applicable.241 The question under the first prong 
should be whether applying § 12112(d)(4) to the medical 
exams or inquiries in a certain case would prohibit or restrict 
the underwriting process of the insurer. If so, the medical 
exams and inquiries are within the protective ambit of 
§ 12201(c)(1). This determination would depend on whether, 
for instance, the insurer requires an individual to take a 
physical exam or fill out a health care questionnaire in order 
to take the health factors of individual employees into 
account when establishing blended, aggregate rates for a 
group health plan.242 Regulations pertaining to the design 
 
240 In Flambeau, the court noted that the EEOC had contended “that 
the court is compelled by traditional principles of statutory interpretation 
to construe § 12201(c)(2) narrowly because it is an ‘exception’ or ‘proviso,’ 
and that by contrast, ‘[t]he ADA is a remedial statute . . . [and] must be 
construed with all the liberality necessary to achieve such purposes,” but 
the court stated “[the EEOC did not] explain the specific manner in which 
§ 12201(c)(2)  should be construed narrowly or how a narrow construction 
would result in the wellness program requirement’s falling outside the 
safe harbor.” EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (W.D. Wis. 
2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2017). 
241 See § 12201(c)(1)–(2); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, Part 2, at 137 (1990), 
as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 421. 
242 That is to say that, though the laws pertaining to the 
permissibility of certain insurance practices have changed since Barnes 
was decided, to the extent insurance laws permit a health insurance issuer 
or self-insured employer to (1) require an individual to take a physical 
exam or fill out a health care questionnaire in order to enroll in a group 
health plan and (2) take health factors of individual employees into 
account when establishing blended, aggregate rates for group health 
plans, see, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, YOUR HEALTH PLAN AND HIPAA . . . 
MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR YOU 16-17 (2013); The HIPAA 
Nondiscrimination Requirements, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_hipaa_ND.html [https://perma.cc/Y9V4-
K44Y] (last visited March 15, 2017) (noting the permissibility of requiring 
that individuals complete health care questionnaires but not explicitly 
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and provision of insurance plans, as well as typical industry 
practices, would bear on this determination; for instance, it 
would seem unlikely that a defendant would be able to 
successfully invoke the protection of § 12201(c)(1) in a case 
involving a small group health plan subject to adjusted 
community rating requirements.243 This may also be a moot 
question in cases where, as typical in large group 
employment situations, an issuer does not use medical 
underwriting but instead determines premium rates based 
on an employer’s prior claims experience.244 
The question under the second prong, meanwhile, would 
be whether applying § 12112(d)(4) to the medical exams or 
inquiries in a certain case would prohibit or restrict an 
employer “from establishing, sponsoring, observing or 
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are 
based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or 
administering such risks.” Construed narrowly, while the 
safe harbor’s first prong provides that the ADA shall not 
restrict an insurer from providing a plan with terms or 
 
addressing requirements to take physical examinations), the ADA does not 
prohibit these practices. 
243 Under the ACA, health plans in the individual and small group 
market are allowed to adjust premiums only on the basis of (1) individual 
or family enrollment, (2) geographic area, (3) age, and (4) tobacco use. See 
generally, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 
REFORMS: RATE RESTRICTIONS (2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation. 
files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8328.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAN8-MXNK]; 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPACT ON PREMIUMS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES WITH EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE FROM THE GUARANTEED ISSUE, GUARANTEED 
RENEWAL, AND FAIR HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS PROVISIONS OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2014), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-
data-and-systems/research/actuarialstudies/downloads/aca-employer-
premium-impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/87YJ-EJZ5]. 
244 See, e.g., Risk Classification in the Voluntary Individual Health 
Insurance Market, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES (Mar. 1, 2009), 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/risk_mar09.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JHU-
UGR9]; Consumer Guide to Group Health Insurance, NAHU, 
http://www.nahu.org/consumer/groupinsurance.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/UA5J-XQGW]. 
CHE – FINAL  
No. 1:280] WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS 341 
 
provisions that are disability-related distinctions, the safe 
harbor’s second prong provides simply that an employer may 
adopt such a plan with legitimate disability-related 
distinctions without running afoul of the ADA’s 
nondiscrimination principles.245 Applying the ADA to 
medical exams and inquiries does not restrict an employer’s 
ability to adopt a health insurance plan containing 
disability-based distinctions that are the product of 
legitimate underwriting practices, except possibly to the 
extent that doing so would prevent the insurer from 
“underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such 
risks.”246 Therefore, though information from medical exams 
and inquiries may be relevant to an employer’s decision to 
adopt a particular insurance plan, to the extent that the safe 
harbor provisions should be construed narrowly,247 the 
second prong should offer no additional protection to medical 
inquiries or exams that are not already within the protective 
ambit of the first prong. 
The third prong of the safe harbor applies to self-insured 
or self-funded health plans,248 under which “the employer 
directly assumes the liability of an insurer.”249 Employers 
with self-funded plans usually hire a third party 
administrator to provide services such as designing the 
benefit plan, estimating costs associated with the plan, 
 
245 Cf. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, INTERIM 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER 
PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (1993), 1993 WL 1497027, at *1–3. 
246 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1)–(2) (2012). 
247 See supra note 240. 
248 § 12201(c)(3); see also, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, Part 2, at 137 
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 421. 
249 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 
1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH 
INSURANCE (1993), 1993 WL 1497027, at *3 n.3 (“Insured health insurance 
plans are regulated by both ERISA and state law. Self-insured plans are 
typically subject to ERISA, but are not subject to state laws that regulate 
insurance.”). 
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collecting premiums from employees, and processing medical 
claims; generally, self-funding employers also purchase stop 
loss insurance policies to mitigate the risk of loss from high 
cost and high frequency claims.250 Self-funding is more 
common among larger employers than smaller employers,251 
but because a self-insured small group employer is not 
subject to a number of regulatory requirements under the 
ACA, including its prohibition on medical underwriting and 
community rating rules, small employers may be 
increasingly deciding to self-fund.252 Since the third prong of 
 
250 See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen & Anant Vinjamoori, Report: Incentives 
for Small firms to Self Fund Their Healthcare Plans, BROOKINGS (Nov. 19, 
2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/incentives-for-small-firms-to-
self-fund-their-healthcare-plans/ [https://perma.cc/XA6A-C9VF]; NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, WHITE PAPER: STOP LOSS 
INSURANCE, SELF-FUNDING AND THE ACA 2 (2015), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/SLI_SF.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPH6-
UMZH]. 
251 See, e.g., Pozen & Vinjamoori, supra note 250 (“Most large firms 
self fund their healthcare programs, rather than buy insurance. By 
contrast, just 8%-16% of small firms (between 1 and 100 full-time 
employees) choose to self-fund.”). 
252 See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 
supra note 250, at 1–2 (“One concern about the potential impact of the 
ACA is that if employers—particularly small employers, with younger, 
healthier employees—self-fund, thereby avoiding some of the 
requirements of the ACA, it will leave the older, sicker population to the 
fully insured, small employer group market. This concern is based on the 
differing underwriting standards. Because the small group market 
requires modified community rating and the self-funded market is allowed 
to reflect an employer’s risk, it is assumed that self-funded plans will be 
attractive to low-risk groups . . . there has been demonstrated interest in 
discussing self-funding in the small group market. One indication of this 
interest that the states are seeing is the development of stop loss 
insurance policies specifically designed to market to small employers.”); 
UC BERKELEY LABOR CENTER, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: SUMMARY OF 
PROVISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE 5 tbl.1 (2014), 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2010/ppaca10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3F2-DXH7]; Pozen & Vinjamoori, supra note 250; 
Potential Implications of the Small Group Definition Expanding to 
Employers with 51-100 Employees, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES (Mar. 2, 2015), 
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the safe harbor “make[s] it clear that [the ADA] will not 
disrupt . . . the current regulatory structure for self-insured 
employers,”253 the question under the third prong should 
be—akin to the question under the first prong—whether 
applying § 12112(d)(4) to medical exams or inquiries in a 
certain case would prohibit or restrict the plan design 
process of a self-insured employer. 
The upshot of this analysis is that insurance practices 
that are regulated by state and federal insurance laws are 
removed from the application of ADA provisions by the 
insurance safe harbor. If the use of medical questionnaires 
and exams to underwrite risks is consistent with the 
applicable insurance laws, an employer who sponsors a plan 
developed through such activities would be protected from 
allegations that it violated § 12112(d)(4)(A) by § 12201(c), as 
was the employer in Barnes. And an employer that receives 
aggregated, de-identified data from these exams or 
questionnaires, as allowed under HIPAA’s privacy rules, 
arguably has done nothing to violate § 12112(d)(4)(A) or to 
evade the purposes of the ADA of preventing employment 
discrimination on the basis of disability.254 In short, though 
the reasoning in a case like Flambeau might be flawed, the 
ultimate practices at issue could still be allowable even 
under a narrow interpretation of the insurance safe harbor—
allowing for employers to obtain anonymous, aggregated 
data, whether to estimate future health care costs or design 
wellness programs, from HRAs and biometric screenings 
without violating the ADA. 
A side effect of how the doctrine concerning the 
application of the ADA to wellness programs has developed 




253 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, Part 2, at 136 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419. 
254 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012) (prohibiting the use of the 
insurance safe harbor provision as subterfuge to evade the purposes of the 
ADA). 
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screening data for insurance purposes.255 Even if, however, 
the safe harbor protects the medical inquiries and exams 
comprising a particular health screening program on the 
basis of their use for insurance underwriting, to the extent 
that this information might be used for other purposes (e.g., 
to identify employees for a disease management program),256 
such use for other purposes is not protected by the safe 
harbor and should arguably be limited. A characteristic of 
the wellness programs at issue in Seff and Flambeau was the 
cross-context use of employee health information, but this 
aspect was not addressed at all by either court’s analysis. 
One possible approach for policymakers to consider would be 
to require that employers obtain employees’ consent before 
using their personal health information outside of the 
insurance context that enabled the collection of that 
information.257 As mentioned in Part I, the question of what 
happens to an employee’s personal health information after 
it is collected is not a trivial one, and the current state of 
data privacy law does not reach many of the potential ways 
in which such information may be surprisingly disclosed. 
Additionally, while HRAs and biometric testing are often 
 
255 See Carmen Castro-Pagan, Employer Groups Don’t See Eye to Eye 
on EEOC Wellness Plan Ruling, BLOOMBERG BNA: HUMAN RESOURCES 
REPORT (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.bna.com/employer-groups-dont-
n57982077504/ [https://perma.cc/PZ4R-HD8F] (noting the view of an 
employee benefits attorney that “[e]mployers that want to assert the safe 
harbor defense should make sure that their wellness plan is really part of 
their health plan and that there is evidence that it is used to assist in 
underwriting, classifying and administering risk under the statutory 
language and as demonstrated in Flambeau”); see also Peppet, supra note 
32, at 155–56 (noting that one “can easily imagine health and life insurers 
demanding or seeking access to fitness and health sensor data, or home 
insurers demanding access to home-monitoring system data. As such data 
become more detailed, sensitive, and revealing, states might consider 
prohibiting insurers from conditioning coverage on their revelation”). 
256 See Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (explaining how the health screening data in that case was used to 
identify employees for a disease management program). 
257 Cf. Peppet, supra note 32, at 151–52 (describing cross-context use 
constraints in other contexts). 
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used together as part of health screening programs to gather 
medical information from employees, there is a basic 
distinction between biometric screening, which may involve 
medical examinations, blood tests, and the use of biometric 
monitoring devices, and a medical questionnaire.258 
Biometric screening is, by nature, more intrusive. Future 
policymakers should take into consideration such ways in 
which wellness program design may impact employee 
privacy, autonomy, and dignity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As employee wellness programs continue to evolve in 
form and use in the workplace, employers will continue to 
seek guidance from regulatory agencies and the courts. As 
the EEOC has developed its regulatory approach under the 
ADA to wellness programs, courts have also endeavored to 
apply the ADA to wellness programs that present new 
questions about the applicability of the statute’s provisions 
to business practices that were not common until recently. 
This Note has reviewed the developing law on the 
application of the ADA’s insurance safe harbor provision to 
wellness programs. Specifically, it has examined questions 
and arguments regarding the ADA’s prohibition on 
disability-related inquiries and medical examinations left 
unaddressed by the case law and the EEOC’s recently issued 
regulation governing wellness incentives. This Note has 
suggested an integrated approach for applying the ADA to 
wellness programs, argued that “wellness programs” such as 
those at issue in Flambeau may remain permissible under 
the ADA’s current regulatory framework despite recent court 
decisions and agency rulemaking, and discussed some of the 
persisting issues with employing the ADA to address 
employees’ legitimate concerns about wellness programs. 
This analysis not only is relevant to employers, employees, 
 
258 See Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the 
Erosion of Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435 for an analogous discussion 
of the importance of informed consent in disease management programs. 
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courts, and regulators seeking a coherent and comprehensive 
interpretation of existing law, but also highlights certain 
complexities of wellness program regulation that ought to be 
accounted for in any future legislation designed to promote 
workplace wellness programs.  
 
